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GAME OF THRONES: THE QATAR CRISIS, 
FORCED EXPULSIONS ON THE ARABIAN 
PENINSULA 
Christopher R. Rossi* 
ABSTRACT 
In an extraordinary move, reflecting the Arabian Peninsula’s worst diplomatic dispute in decades, 
the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt have expelled Qatari nationals and imposed an 
air and sea blockade against Qatar because of its alleged support of terrorist organizations. In 
June 2018, Qatar filed suit against the UAE at the International Court of Justice, alleging 
discrimination in violation the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination. This Article explores the problem of forced expulsion and the utility of 
formal judicial redress at the level of the ICJ. Borrowing from the frame analysis of Erving 
Goffman, this clash portrays the dispute in terms of ceremonial performance (dramaturgy) that 
better suggests its removal to softer, more discursive forums for dispute settlement, such as the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (“GCC”). Although already described as a major victim of this dispute, 
the GCC may better preserve the dynamics of purposeful negotiation involving a situation that 
bears resemblance to a family feud as much as a clash of state interests. This dispute highlights 
the expanding problem of nationality, migration, and human rights in an age of terror, and the 
limits but need of informal international legal means to best frame meaningful solutions to an 
expanding problem. The twentieth century’s experience with the problem of forced migration 
indicated the need for international legal reforms. The current problem on the Arabian Peninsula 
signifies clearly that the project to address the issue continues. This Article explores the problem 
of forced expulsion and the utility of formal judicial redress at the level of the ICJ. After reviewing 
the history of hospitality and expulsion, this Article factors into the discussion the motivational 
fear of terrorism and frames the discussion against the backdrops of competing UAE and Qatari 
claims. The utility of litigating this case before the ICJ is then assessed in terms of substance and 
dramaturgy, leading to a reconsideration of the value of a soft law solution, perhaps in a way that 
can reinvigorate the GCC, which has been badly damaged by the dispute. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 11, 2018, the State of Qatar, located on the 
northeastern headland of the Arabian Peninsula and surrounded by 
Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, filed suit against the United Arab 
Emirates (“UAE”) at the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).1 
Article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ provides that the Court’s 
jurisdiction comprises “all matters specially provided for . . . in treaties 
and conventions in force.”2 In its complaint, Qatar alleged that the 
UAB had violated the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”), to which both parties 
belong.3 This case again tests the jurisdictional limits of this 
                                                 
 1 See Interpretation and Application of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (The State of Qatar v. The United 
Arab Emirates), Application Instituting Proceedings (June 11, 2018), 
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/172/172-20180611-APP-01-00-EN.pdf 
[hereinafter Qatar v. UAE Application]. See also International Court of Justice Press 
Release, No. 2018/26 (June 11, 2018), http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/172/172-20180611-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf [hereinafter Press Release]. 
 2 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36(1), https://www.icj-
cij.org/en/statute. 
 3 Qatar alleged violations of Arts. 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7. See International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for 
signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter 
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convention, which Georgia unsuccessfully invoked against Russia for 
its interventions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia,4 and Ukraine 
currently tests against Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its 
treatment of Ukrainian and Tatar minorities.5 In addition to the 
individual human rights harms alleged, the Court likely will determine 
CERD’s jurisdictional applicability to the travel embargo and media 
restriction complaints. 
Qatar accused the UAE of targeting Qataris based on their 
national origin,6 in violation of CERD’s prohibition against racial 
                                                 
CERD]. See also Press Release, supra note 1, at 1. Qatar acceded to the CERD on July 
22, 1976 and the UAE on June 20, 1974. See U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-
2&chapter=4&clang=_en. 
 4 See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary 
Objections, Judgment, 2011, I.C.J 70, (Apr. 1), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/140/140-20110401-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf (holding the Court had no 
jurisdiction to entertain Georgia’s application). 
 5 See, e.g., Application of the International Convention for the Suppression 
of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Pending Cases, I.C.J., 
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/pending-cases. Additionally, Palestine has filed an inter-
state complaint against Israel for breaches of CERD “given the urgency of the 
situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.” See The 
State of Palestine Lodges an Interstate Complaint Against Israel under the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF., ST. 
PALESTINE (Apr. 24, 2018), http://www.mofa.pna.ps/en/2018/04/24/the-state-
of-palestine-lodges-an-interstate-complaint-against-israel-under-the-convention-on-
the-elimination-of-all-forms-of-racial-discrimination/. See also Israel Reacts to the 
CERD Committee’s Statement, MISSION ISR. UNITED NATIONS GENEVA (May 14, 
2018), 
http://embassies.gov.il/UnGeneva/NewsAndEvents/MediaStatements/Pages/20
180504-Israel-reacts-to-the-CERD-Committee-statement.aspx. Procedures 
regarding the inter-state complaint process are handled by the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination in accordance with terms of the Convention. 
See CERD, supra note 3, at Part II (detailing relevant articles governing the committee 
and its procedures). 
 6 See Qatar v. UAE Application, supra note 1, ¶ 3; Application of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(Qatar v. United Arab Emirates) Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 
Order, 2018 I.C.J. ¶ 19 (July 23), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
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discrimination. CERD Article 1(1) defines racial discrimination as “any 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin” which has the purpose or effect 
of impairing the exercise of human rights on an equal footing in fields 
of public life.7 In addition to objecting to Qatar’s factual allegation, the 
UAE asserted that Qatar’s claims fall outside the scope of the ratione 
materiae of CERD, and that granting preferences to nationals of a 
particular country over another, although accenting the individual’s 
present nationality, do not discriminate on the basis of the individual’s 
national or ethnic origin: “[t]he UAE considers that the term ‘national 
origin’ in Article 1, paragraph 1, of CERD is ‘twinned with’ ‘ethnic 
origin’ and that ‘national origin’ is not to be read as encompassing 
‘present nationality.’”8 
On June 5, 2017, the UAE severed diplomatic ties with Qatar,9 
expelled all Qataris within its borders, prohibited them from traveling 
through the UAE, closed UAE airspace and seaports to Qatari 
nationals, allegedly abridged Qatari rights of protest and free speech, 
                                                 
related/172/172-20180723-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf [hereinafter Qatar v. UAE 
Provisional Measures]. 
 7 CERD, supra note 3, art. 1(1). 
 8 Qatar v. UAE Provisional Measures, supra note 6, ¶¶ 23, 24. The UAE also 
argued that the measures it adopted in June 2017 imposed requirements on entry or 
re-entry into its territory by Qatari nationals and that there has been no mass 
expulsion of Qataris. See id. ¶ 24. The Court concluded that Qatar’s claims “are 
capable of falling within the scope of CERD ratione materiae” and that the Court need 
not decide at this stage of proceedings whether the expression “national origin” 
contained in CERD encompasses discrimination based on present nationality. Id. ¶ 
27. The Court voted in favor of three of nine requested provisional measures: that 
separated Qatari families be reunited, that Qatari students resume their education in 
the UAE or be given access to their educational records, and that Qataris be allowed 
access to tribunals and other judicial organs of the UAE. The Court also ordered the 
parties to refrain from actions aggravating the dispute. See ICJ PRESS RELEASE 
(Unofficial), No. 2018/36, July 23, 2018, at 4, https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/172/172-20180723-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf. 
 9 See Patrick Wintour, Gulf Plunged Into Diplomatic Crisis as Countries Cut Ties 
with Qatar, 
GUARDIAN, (June 5, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/05/saudi-arabia-and-bahrain-
break-diplomatic-ties-with-qatar-over-terrorism (noting the severance in diplomatic 
relations among Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain with Qatar). 
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and shut down local Qatari media outlets, including the Qatari-owned 
Al Jazeera Media Network.10 When announcing its measures, the UAE 
accused Qatar of destabilizing the region by supporting terrorist 
organizations.11 Invoking the doctrine of parens patriae,12 Qatar claimed 
the UAE’s actions interfered with marriage and choice of spouse 
rights, along with rights of free expression, work, property enjoyment, 
and equal treatment before tribunals.13 In an effort to protect Qatari 
nationals, Qatar requested cessation of discriminatory measures, 
compliance with CERD obligations, assurance and guarantees of non-
repetition, reparations, and provisional measures of protection 
pending final judgment.14 Additionally, Qatar explored avenues of 
redress with the UN International Civil Aviation Organization 
(“ICAO”) in Montreal,15 and filed a complaint with the World Trade 
                                                 
 10 See Qatar v. UAE Application, supra note 1, ¶ 3. Qatar also alleged the 
UAE directly incited hate speech. See id. ¶ 4. See also S.G. Sreejith, Legality of the Gulf 
Ban on Qatari Flights: State Sovereignty at Crossroads 43 AIR & SPACE L. 191–203 (2018). 
 11 See Qatar v. UAE Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record CR 2018/13 
Thursday, June 28, 2018, at 10 am ¶ 6, 11 (Mr. Alnowais: alleging that Qatar illegally 
funneled one billion dollars “to entities affiliated with terrorist organizations”), 
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/172/172-20180628-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf. 
See also Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Yemen Sever Ties to Qatar over ‘Terrorism’ in Biggest 
Regional Crisis in Years, STRAITS TIMES (June 5, 2017), 
https://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-cuts-ties-to-qatar-
cites-terrorism. 
 12 A type of wardship originally applied by the court at Common law to 
commit the mentally ill to the care of others, or to render service under a feudal 
tenurial system. It grew by the early seventeenth century to associate regal power as 
the “Parens patriae, the political father of his people.” Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins 
of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195, 201 (1978). 
 13 See Qatar v. UAE Application, supra note 1, ¶¶ 31–46. During oral 
proceedings, Qatar claimed “over 3,600 recorded marriages between Qataris and 
Emiratis” had been affected by the measures. Qatar v. UAE Provisional Measures, 
Verbatim Record 2018/12, Wed. June 27, 2018, 10 am, ¶ 30, 41 (Ms. Amirfar). 
 14 See Interpretation and Application of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. The United Arab 
Emirates), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection, I.C.J. 
2018 (June 11), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/172/172-20180611-WRI-
01-00-EN.pdf [hereinafter Qatar v. UAE Provisional Measures]. See also Qatar v. 
UAE Application, supra note 1, ¶¶ 65–66. 
 15 See Qatar Airways Expected To Access New Flight Routes, AL JAZEERA (July 31, 
2017) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/qatar-airways-expected-access-
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Organization (“WTO”),16 which could lead to WTO panel 
interpretation of the security exception under the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).17 
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt—not parties to CERD—
supported the UAE action in a “self-described [a]nti-Terror Quartet,” 
and imposed land, sea, and air blockades on Qatar, in concert with the 
UAE.18 Adding to the economic and diplomatic blockade, Saudi 
Arabia recently revealed plans to dig a canal to separate Qatar from the 
Arabian mainland—also proposing to construct a nuclear waste site 
and military base on the southern shore of the newly created island, 
still within the Saudi frontier separating the two countries.19 These 
measures resurrect legal discussions that classify a blockade as an act 
                                                 
air-corridors-170801020434530.html (detailing closed-door discussions with the 
ICAO to establish contingency air corridors for Qatar’s national airline). 
 16 See Qatar Files WTO Complaints Against The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain 
And Saudi Arabia, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Aug. 4, 2017), 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/ds526_7_8rfc_04aug17_e.htm 
(requesting dispute consultations). 
 17 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), WORLD TRADE 
ORG., art. XXI, 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm#articleXXI. For a 
discussion of art. XXI implications, see Johannes Fahner, Qatar Under Siege: Chances for 
an Article XXI Case? EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/qatar-
under-siege-chances-for-an-article-xxi-case/. 
 18 Simon Henderson, A Field Trip to the Front Lines of the Qatar-Saudi Cold War, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 28, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/28/a-field-
trip-to-the-front-lines-of-the-qatar-saudi-cold-war/. 
 19 Frank Jacobs, Saudi Arabia Threatens to Turn Qatar into an Island, BIGTHINK 
(Apr. 12, 2018), https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/saudis-threaten-to-turn-qatar-
into-an-island. See also James M. Dorsey, Saudi Arabia Turns Qatar into an Island, 
FAIROBSERVER (Apr. 16, 2018), 
https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/qatar-crisis-
saudi-arabia-gulf-news-khaleej-33094/ (detailing plans for a $750 million, 37.5 mile 
(60km) canal, 200 meters wide and 20 meters deep on the Saudi Arabian border of 
the Peninsula). 
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of war20 and breathe life into the disfavored, early twentieth century 
idea of the pacific blockade.21 
Unlike the articulation of human rights in the western tradition, 
where abstract and political Enlightenment values of liberty and 
equality take on deep significance, personalized and deeply familial 
relationships among the Saudis, the Emiratis, and the Qataris 
inextricably combine with political questions. Frayed, yet deep kinship 
ties, personalized rivalries,22 and competing understandings of 
Wahhabism23 contribute to this regional crisis of royal factionalism. 
                                                 
 20 See generally Quincy Wright, When Does War Exist? 26 AM. J. INT’L L. 362 
(1932) (discussing the declaration of war doctrine with multiple references to the 
legal significance of a blockade). 
 21 See generally Albert H. Washburn, The Legality of the Pacific Blockade I, 21 
COLUM. L. Rev. 55 (1921). 
 22 See Randeep Ramesh, The Long-Running Family Rivalries Behind the Qatar 
Crisis, GUARDIAN (July 21, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/21/qatar-crisis-may-be-rooted-in-
old-family-rivalries (noting that political issues in the region often involve family 
issues). See also Saudi Arabia Cuts Off Qatar, ECONOMIST (June 10, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2017/06/10/saudi-arabia-
cuts-off-qatar (discussing troubled dynastic relations among the Al Thanis, Al 
Khalifas, Al Sabahs and Al Sauds). 
 23 Saudi Arabia and Qatar adhere to the legal thought of the ninth-century 
Islamic legal scholar, Ahmad ibn Hanbal; the Hanbali school is the most orthodox 
of the Sunni law formulations, which developed into the Wahhabism movement, 
named after the eighteenth-century theologian Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab 
(1703–1792). See Hanbali School of Law, OXFORD DICTIONARY ISLAM, 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e799 (last visited Dec. 2, 
2018). Despite similarities emanating from the same Wahhabi and Hanbali teachings, 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia state-religious relations differ in important respects, for 
instance the lack of a religious police institution in Qatar to enforce public morality. 
See Birol Baskan & Steven Wright, Seeds of Change: Comparing State-Religion Relations in 
Qatar and Saudi Arabia, 33 ARAB STUD. Q. 96, 97 (2011). Qatari Wahhabism is 
sometimes said to have formed given Qatar’s outward looking maritime trade 
history—a Wahhabism of the sea—as opposed to Saudi Arabia’s more stringent 
Wahhabism of the land. See James M. Dorsey, Wahhabism vs. Wahhabism: Qatar 
challenges Saudi Arabia 2 (RSIS Working Paper No. 262, 2013), 
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/WP262.pdf [hereinafter 
“Wahhabism v. Wahhabism”]. On Wahhabism’s history, place in the modern state, 
relation to Islamic revivalism, and challenges to its peninsular hegemony, see 
generally DAVID COMMINS, THE WAHHABI MISSION AND SAUDI ARABIA (2006). 
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The dispute intermixes fundamentally autocratic, rentier24 regime 
structures with questions of political Islam and commercial enterprise. 
It contrasts Qatar’s maverick international status and increasingly 
autonomous and assertive foreign policy since the Arab Spring,25 with 
conservative Gulf Sheikdoms and Oman’s Sultanate. It poses 
contextual challenges external to the ICJ’s formal dispute settlement 
mechanisms, while raising questions and hopes of political 
liberalization against a regional backdrop impacted by globalization, 
                                                 
 24 Rentierism “refers to the (relative) dependence of states on rents for their 
internal functioning. Rents are understood to be forms of income generated from 
the export of natural resources, usually oil and gas.” ROLF SCHWARZ, WAR AND 
STATE BUILDING IN THE MIDDLE EAST 121 n.5 (2012). Extensive research suggests 
that rentierist economies impede the formation of strong, legitimate states and give 
“life-support” to institutionally weak and politically accountable states. Id. at 2. For 
citations to confirming literature, see id. at 4–5. See also ALLEN J. FROMHERZ, QATAR: 
A MODERN HISTORY 111–124 (2017) (on peculiarities associated with Qatar as a 
“classic rentier state”). 
 25 See generally Mohammed Nuruzzaman, Qatar and the Arap Spring: Down the 
Foreign Policy Slope, 8 CONTEMP. ARAB AFF. 226 (2015) (on Qatar’s “high profile” 
foreign policy); MATTHEW GRAY, QATAR: POLITICS AND THE CHALLENGES OF 
DEVELOPMENT 207 (2013) (noting Qatar’s “highly activist” international role during 
the Arab Spring); KRISTIAN COATES ULRICHSEN, QATAR AND THE ARAB SPRING 4 
(2014) (noting Qatar’s shift in foreign policy in 2011 in favor of the Arab Spring 
movement). The Arab Spring refers to the spread of mass opposition movements 
across North Africa, the Levant and Persian Gulf States. It resulted in the “rapid 
demise of Presidents Ben Ali and Mubarak in Tunisia and Egypt, the eventual ousting 
of Colonel Gaddafi and Ali Abdullah Saleh from power in Libya and Yemen,” and 
intensified opposition to regimes in Bahrain and Syria, with “mounting tensions” in 
the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia,” tensions in Oman, and political protests in 
Kuwait. Interestingly, it sparked a “phenomenal increase in Twitter usage in all GCC 
States, with Saudi Arabia registering the world’s fastest rate of growth in Twitter 
users throughout 2012.” Id. at 5. Qatar has been described as a hybrid diplomatic 
actor among Gulf States. It has worked with the US and Hamas, and with Hezbollah 
and Iran. It has mediated behind the scenes with Israel and Lebanon, supported Arab 
Spring revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and remained circumspect during the 
uprising in Bahrain. See generally Andrew F. Cooper & Bessma Momani, Qatar and 
Expanded Contours of Small State Diplomacy, 46 INT’L SPECTATOR 113 (2011). Qatar’s 
support for the Al Jazeera media complex, which is based in Doha, has drawn huge 
audiences throughout the Arab world “for its hard-hitting reporting and provocative 
programming,” including reports critical of most Arab governments. J.E. Peterson, 
Qatar and the World: Branding for a Micro-State, 60 MIDDLE EAST J. 732 and 
accompanying n.1 (2006). 
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ineffective civic institutions, tribal patronage, agnatic seniority, 
patrimony, and tremendous wealth and inequality.26 
Yemen, the Eastern government of Libya, Maldives, 
Mauritania, and Comoros, in “brotherly” support of Saudi Arabia, cut 
diplomatic ties with Qatar. Further, four other countries downgraded 
relations with Qatar.27 A thirteen point list of Saudi demands 
accompanied what was described as the “Gulf’s worst diplomatic 
dispute in decades,”28 spawning a propaganda war in Washington, D.C. 
and at the United Nations (“UN”).29 Mediation efforts facilitated by 
                                                 
 26 See MARC C. THOMPSON & NEIL QUILLIAM, POLICY MAKING IN THE 
GCC: STATE, CITIZENS AND INSTITUTIONS 2 (Mark C. Thompson & Neil Quilliam 
eds., 2017) (assessing the absence of responsive governance in GCC countries); 
Ramesh, supra note 22 (noting the intermix of kinship ties and family relationships as 
problems for political dispute settlement). See also Mehran Kamrava, Royal Factionalism 
and Political Liberalization in Qatar, 63 MIDDLE EAST J. 401 (2009) (discounting 
meaningful political liberalization in Qatar); and FROMHERZ, supra note 24, at 161 
(noting that Qatari citizens can only vote if their family has been living on the 
Peninsula since before 1930). 
 27 Jordan, Djibouti, Chad, and Niger. See Qatar-Gulf Crisis: Your Questions 
Answered, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 5, 1017), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/qatar-gulf-crisis-questions-
answered-170606103033599.html#blockading-countries. 
 28 Patrick Wintour, Qatar Given 10 Days to Meet 13 Sweeping Demands by Saudi 
Arabia, GUARDIAN (June 23, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/23/close-al-jazeera-saudi-arabia-
issues-qatar-with-13-demands-to-end-blockade (listing the demands as: curbing 
diplomatic ties with Iran, severing ties to terrorist organizations, shutting down Al-
Jazeera, shutting down other news outlets such as Arabi21 and Rassd, terminating 
Turkey’s military presence in Qatar, stopping funding means for terrorist individuals 
and groups, handing over “terrorist figures”, ending interference in other countries’ 
internal affairs, stopping contact with political opposition forces in Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain, compensating blockading powers for associated financial 
losses, consenting to monthly external compliance checks, aligning militarily, 
politically, socially, and economically with other Gulf and Arab countries, agreeing 
to all demands within 10 days). 
 29 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Qatar Pulls the Human Rights Card in Washington 
PR Blitz, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 11, 2017) 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/11/qatar-pulls-the-human-rights-card-in-
washington-pr-blitz-saudi-arabia-gulf-blockade/ (noting Qatar’s emphasis on the 
blockade’s human rights costs); Gulf Crisis: Qatar FM Meets UN Security Council 
Members, AL JAZEERA (July 1, 2017), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/gulf-crisis-qatar-fm-meets-security-
2019 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 7:1 
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Kuwait and backed by the United States (“U.S.”), the UN, and 
European powers, reduced the demands to six principles around which 
resolution of the crisis now revolves.30 Even reduced to six principles, 
the demands to end the blockade reflect the imprecisions of a pactum 
de contrahendo.31 Such clauses permit hostile bargaining partners 
breathing space to sidestep temporarily nettlesome details or wrongful 
acts that could impede negotiations, however they can fruitlessly 
contribute to impasse by avoiding or postponing discussion of details 
at the heart of the dispute.32 
A report issued by the human rights organization, Amnesty 
International, labeled the one week deadline issued against Qataris by 
                                                 
council-members-170701042724973.html (on Qatar’s UN mission’s efforts to sway 
non-permanent members of the Security Council). See also Hassan Hassan, Qatar Won 
the Saudi Blockade, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 4, 2018), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/04/qatar-won-the-saudi-blockade/ 
(estimating that Qatar and Saudi Arabia spent about $1.5 billion each on public 
relations campaigns and that Qatar seems to be winning in the court of public 
opinion). 
 30 In a joint statement issued on July 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, 
and Bahrain listed the six principles as: 1) Commitment to combat extremism and 
terrorism in all forms and to prevent their financing or the provision of safe haven; 
2) prohibiting acts of incitement; 3) full commitment to Riyadh Agreement 2013 and 
Gulf Cooperation Council Supplementary Agreement; 4) commitment to outcomes 
of the Arab-Islamic-US summit in Riyadh in May 2017; 5) refraining from interfering 
with internal affairs of States; and 6) supporting the responsibility of all states to 
confront all forms of extremism and terrorism. See Joint Statement by the Foreign 
Ministers of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, EMBASSY 
KINGDOM SAUDI ARABIA (July 5, 2017), 
https://www.saudiembassy.net/statements/joint-statement-foreign-ministers-
saudi-arabia-egypt-united-arab-emirates-and-bahrain. After nine months of 
negotiation, Qatar made several concessions; it pledged not to naturalize GCC 
citizens and it asked several members of the Muslim Brotherhood who had fled 
Egypt to Qatar to leave or not to return. See DAVID B. ROBERTS, QATAR: SECURING 
THE GLOBAL AMBITIONS OF A CITY-STATE 152 (2017). 
 31 An agreement to conclude a future agreement. See Ulrich Beyerlin, Pactum 
de Contrahendo, Pactum de Negotiando, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 854 (Rudolf Berhardt ed., 1984). 
 32 See Stephen L. Kass, Obligatory Negotiations in International Organizations, 3 
CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 36, 39 (1965) (breathing space); Antonio Cassese, The Israel-PLO 
Agreement and Self-Determination, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 564, 566 n.6 (1993) (quoting 
Beyerlin’s view on potential employment to avoid obligation). 
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the UAE and the other states across the Gulf as “arbitrary” and 
contemptuous of human dignity.33 Additionally, the report noted the 
banishment extended to mixed-nationality families, placing them at the 
“heart of a political crisis.”34 The head of Qatar’s National Human 
Rights committee estimated that the humanitarian costs of the 
blockade would directly affect 19,000 Qataris living in the four 
blockading countries and possibly 11,300 individuals from the 
blockading countries living in Qatar.35 
The targeting of Qataris, collectively referred to as 
“Discriminatory Measures,”36 drew the attention of six special 
rapporteurs,37 who made an urgent appeal to the UAE of the adverse 
situation.38 The UAE objected to and dismissed the concerns without 
                                                 
 33 Gulf/Qatar Dispute: Human Dignity Trampled and Families Facing Uncertainty as 
Sinister Deadline Passes, AMNESTY INT’L (June 19, 2017), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/gulf-qatar-dispute-human-
dignity-trampled-and-families-facing-uncertainty-as-sinister-deadline-passes/. 
 34 Id. A Qatari National Human Rights Committee report approximated that 
8,254 Saudis, 2,349 Bahrainis, and 784 Emiratis lived in Qatar prior to the crisis and 
that 1,927 Qataris lived in these three neighboring countries. See Qatar: Isolation 
Causing Rights Abuses, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 12, 2017), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/13/qatar-isolation-causing-rights-abuses. 
 35 Krishnadev Calamur, Tillerson Calls Qatar’s Position in Dispute with Arab 
States ‘Very Reasonable’, ATLANTIC (July 11, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/07/qatar-tillerson/533259/. 
 36 See Qatar v. UAE Application, supra note 1, ¶ 5. The UAE later modified 
the deportation decree to exempt Qataris married to Emirati nationals. See UAE 
Exempts Qataris Married To Emiratis From Expulsion Order: Paper, REUTERS (June 12, 
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-emirates-idUSKBN1930V8. 
 37 Communication to Government of the United Arab Emirates, Mandates 
of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression; the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; the 
Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants; the Special Rapporteur on 
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related 
intolerance; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human 
rights while countering terrorism; and the Special Rapporteur on the right to 
education, 18 August 2017. See Qatar v. UAE Application, supra note 1, ¶ 14. 
 38 Joint Communication from Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the 
Human Rights Council to the United Arab Emirates, AU ARE 5/2017 (Aug. 18, 
2017), at 1, 4 [hereinafter Joint Communication of Special Procedures Mandate 
Holders] (connecting concerns about the right to movement and residence, family 
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addressing them.39 A Human Rights Watch report detailed the human 
toll in terms of stranded workers, family separations, and interrupted 
medical care and education.40 Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, expressed “alarm” about the human 
rights impact caused by the “overly broad” measures.41 In addition, the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(“OHCHR”) affirmed the actions as arbitrary and noted in December 
2017 that most measures made “no distinction between the 
Government of Qatar and its population,” thus they amounted to 
unilateral coercions that had a “potentially durable effect on” the 
human rights of those affected.42 
Leading human rights authorities, John Dugard and William 
Schabas, concluded the coalition’s actions illegally comprised unilateral 
                                                 
unity, education, work, freedom of expression, health and the right to property in 
relation to CERD). 
 39 See Qatar v. UAE Application, supra note 1, ¶ 14 (noting that the UAE 
registered high displeasure at receiving the Sept. 18, 2017 communication—phrased 
as an urgent appeal—and declined to address the asserted violations). 
 40 Qatar: Isolation Causing Rights Abuses, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 12, 2017), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/13/qatar-isolation-causing-rights-abuses. 
 41 Qatar Diplomatic Crisis: Comment by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein on Impact on Human Rights, OFF. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER 
HUM. RTS. (June 14, 2017), 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=217
39&LangID=E. 
 42 OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, 17–24 November 2017, 
Rep. on the Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights, ¶¶ 60 (“durable effect”), 61 
(“unilateral”), and 64 (“no distinction”), (2017) http://nhrc-qa.org/en/themencode-
pdf-viewer/?file=http://nhrc-qa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/OHCHR-
TM-REPORT-ENGLISH-1.pdf [hereinafter OHCHR Report]. See also Qatar 
Diplomatic Crisis: Comment by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al 
Hussein on Impact on Human Rights, OFF. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS. (June 
14, 2017), 
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=217
39&LangID=E (expressing “alarm about the possible impact on many people’s 
human rights” given the decision by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain to 
ties with Qatar.); Statement of Dr. Ali Smaikh Al Marri, Chairman, National Human 
Rights Committee (Qatar), 10:16 mark [undated], http://nhrc-qa.org/ (affirming 
that “the continuation of this crisis will damage the social fabric of the Gulf family.”). 
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coercive measures (sanctions).43 Under their analysis, the UAE actions 
violated the Declaration on Friendly Relations,44 the Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,45 the UN 
Charter, and to the extent coalition partners have acceded to them, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights.46 
Details may be hard to pin down. Professors Dugard and Schabas 
concluded that “Qatar has committed no internationally wrongful 
act.”47 Unsuccessful interventions at the Human Rights Council,48 and 
by Kuwait as mediator,49 propelled the case to The Hague, a forum 
generally and historically eschewed by Arab countries.50 
The anti-Qatar bloc seeks to pressure Qatar into ending 
support for various Islamist groups, including Ahrar al-Sham in 
northern Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, religious 
insurrectionists in Libya, anti-Saudi and Shia communities in Saudi 
Arabia’s fractious eastern Qatif province,51 and Saudi-opposed Houthi 
rebels in Yemen. Regarding the latter claim, a 2014 war pitting Saudi 
                                                 
 43 See Professor John Dugard & Professor William Schabas, The Blockade of 
Qatar One Year On: Violations of Human Rights and Coercive Measures 1-7 (June 5, 2018), 
http://tgchambers.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Qatar-report.pdf. See also 
OHCHR Report, supra note 42, ¶ 61 (characterizing the UAE measures as 
conforming to the definition of unilateral coercive measures). 
 44 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations, at Annex, PP 9 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
 45 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10, at 128–139 (2001). 
 46 See Dugard & Schabas, supra note 43, at 5. 
 47 Dugard & Schabas, supra note 43, at 4. 
 48 See, e.g., Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatar Calls on Human Rights Council 
to Immediately End Siege Countries’ Violations, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2018/02/28/qatar-calls-on-
human-rights-council-to-immediately-end-siege-countries’-violations (presenting 
Qatar’s appeal to the Human Rights Council). 
 49 Qatar v. UAE Application, supra note 1, ¶ 17. 
 50 See Cesare P.R. Romano, International Judicialization in the Arab World: An 
Initial Assessment 33–34 (iCourts Working Paper Series, No. 49, 2016) (noting the 
relatively few cases since 1946 where Arab states have been involved as applicant or 
respondent before the ICJ). 
 51 Wintour, supra note 9. 
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interests and ground forces (supporting the internationally recognized 
Hadi regime, which controls the major Indian Ocean port of Aden) 
against the Iranian-backed Houthi Zaydi Shiites (who control Yemen’s 
capital city, Sana’a) has turned into the “world’s largest humanitarian 
catastrophe” and a deepening security problem for Saudi Arabia.52 
Qatar, although Sunni-dominated, shares close economic ties and 
offshore energy interests with Iran and its Shia population.53 An alleged 
computer hack of a speech by the Qatari emir in support of Iran 
sparked this crisis.54 The Saudi-led alliance in Yemen has since 
                                                 
 52 Bruce Riedel, In Yemen, Iran Outsmarts Saudi Arabia Again, BROOKINGS 
INST. (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/06/in-
yemen-iran-outsmarts-saudi-arabia-again/. See also Yemen, Humanitarian Response Plan 
January-December 2018, UNOCHA (Jan. 2018), at 2, 
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-response-plan-january-
december-2018-enar (last visited Dec. 2, 2018) (noting 22.2 million people in Yemen 
now need humanitarian or protection assistance, including 11.3 million who are in 
acute need). See also Helene Cooper, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, & Eric Schmitt, Army 
Special Forces Secretly Help Saudis Combat Threat from Yemen Rebels, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/us/politics/green-berets-saudi-
yemen-border-houthi.html (discussing the secret movement of U.S. Army Special 
Forces to the Yemeni border in support of the Saudi military campaign and the 
launching of more than 100 missiles since 2015 into the Saudi kingdom by Houthi 
forces). 
 53 See Tim Lister, Unraveling the Qatar Crisis: Sunni, Shia, Saudi, Iranian—and 
Trump, CNN (June 7, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/07/middleeast/qatar-
crisis-analysis/index.html (noting the huge gas field in the Persian Gulf shared by 
Qatar and Iran [known in Qatar as the North Field and in Iran as South Pars]); 
LAWRENCE G. POTTER, The Rise and Fall of Port Cities in the Persian Gulf, in THE 
PERSIAN GULF IN MODERN TIMES: PEOPLE, PORTS, AND HISTORY 131, 145 
(Lawrence G. Potter ed., 2014) (noting the necessity of Iranian-Qatari cooperation 
to develop their shared undersea gas field). 
 54 Qatar v. UAE Application, supra note 1, ¶ 21 (noting the “spark that lit 
the fuse”). See also Patrick Wintour, Russian Hackers to Blame for Sparking Qatar Crisis, 
FBI Inquiry Finds, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/07/russian-hackers-qatar-crisis-
fbi-inquiry-saudi-arabia-uae (questioning who would have commissioned the 
freelance hackers); Greg Myre, Report: United Arab Emirates Hacked Qatar, Sparking 
Gulf Crisis, NPR (June 17, 2017) (quoting unnamed U.S. intelligence officials from a 
Washington Post report). The quotations, which appeared on a crawl across T.V. 
screens on May 23, 2017 and attributed to the emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al 
Thani, read: “Iran is an Islamic power in the region that cannot be ignored;” and 
“Hamas is the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” Dexter Filkins, 
Quest to Remake the Middle East, NEW YORKER (Apr. 9, 2018), 
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removed Qatar from its coalition,55 and Qatar has restored full 
diplomatic ties with Iran.56 This removal from the alliance adds to 
fissures exposed during a Saudi-Qatar dispute for influence in Syria, 
which impeded opposition efforts to topple Bashar al-Assad’s 
regime.57 Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain broke diplomatic 
relations with Qatar in 2014,58 based on violations of a non-public 
security understanding crafted at a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
Riyadh meeting in November 2013.59 
Omani and Kuwaiti intermediaries provided a pathway for 
reconciliation within the GCC that led to the Riyadh Supplemental 
Agreement in November 2014, which affirmed norms of non-
interference.60 Saudi sources now allege Qatar never fulfilled those 
mostly concealed-from-public commitments,61 pointedly blaming Al 
                                                 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/04/09/a-saudi-princes-quest-to-
remake-the-middle-east. 
 55 Qatar Reneged on Its Promises, Documents Reveal, SAUDI GAZETTE (June 11, 
2017), http://saudigazette.com.sa/article/512571/SAUDI-ARABIA/Qatar. 
 56 See UAE Responds as Qatar Restores Full Diplomatic Ties With Iran, NATIONAL 
(Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/uae-responds-as-qatar-
restores-full-diplomatic-ties-with-iran-1.622417 (eliciting the claim from the UAE 
Foreign Minister that Qatar has “escalated its troubles”). 
 57 See Saudi-Qatar Crisis Puts Syrian Rebels in Tricky Position, INQUIRER.NET 
(June 17, 2017), http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/906325/saudi-qatar-crisis-puts-syrian-
rebels-in-tricky-position. Al-Assad’s regime is likely to prevail over this revolt 
stemming from the 2010 Arab Spring, notwithstanding billions of dollars of western 
and Gulf state assistance for the opposition, and one of the costliest covert action 
programs in the history of the CIA. See Aron Lund, How Assad’s Enemies Gave Up on 
the Syrian Opposition, CENTURY FOUND. (Oct. 17, 2017), 
https://tcf.org/content/report/assads-enemies-gave-syrian-opposition/. 
 58 See ROBERTS, supra note 30, at 151 (noting the recall of ambassadors from 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain). 
 59 See Islam Khalid Hassan, GCC’s 2014 Crisis: Causes, Issues and Solutions, AL 
JAZEERA CTR. STUD. (Mar. 31, 2015), 
http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/dossiers/2015/03/201533172623652531.html. 
 60 Amira Howeidy, Saudia Arabia, UAE Make Amends With Qatar, AL-
AHRAMWEEKLY (Nov. 20–26, 2014), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/7789.aspx 
(noting parties variously refer to the Riyadh Consultative Summit document as 
“document,” “agreement,” or “supplementary agreement,” and that its contents have 
not been disclosed fully). 
 61 See, e.g., Qatar Reneged on Its Promises, Documents Reveal, SAUDI GAZETTE (July 
11, 2017), http://saudigazette.com.sa/article/512571/SAUDI-ARABIA/Qatar 
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Jazeera media platforms and professionals for their advancement of an 
anti-GCC agenda.62 The anti-Qatar coalition, fortified by the 
solidification of Egyptian General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s 2013 coup d’état 
against Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood (which ended 
Egypt’s restive thirty-month failed transition to democracy following 
President Hosni Mubarak’s forced resignation), provide stout 
opposition to a negotiated end to Qatar’s isolation.63 This stalemate 
may contribute to sub-regional competitions stretching from the Gaza 
Strip to the Horn of Africa64 and represents the ongoing repercussions 
of the tumultuous 2011 Arab Spring.65 
In May 2018, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister concluded that no 
“glimmer of hope for a solution” appears on the horizon.66 Employing 
an alliterative taxonomy of dysfunctionality, Richard Falk described 
the crisis as a multidimensional descent into “chaos, conflict, and 
coercion” for the region.67 Falk noted “dubious major assumptions” 
of the anti-Qatar bloc, including the coalition’s identification of the 
Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and the coalition’s 
“own extensive funding of radical madrassas throughout the Muslim 
                                                 
(referring to the Riyadh Agreement of 2013 and the Supplementary Agreement of 
2014). 
 62 Ben Flanagan, Al Jazeera Bias Under Spotlight Amid GCC Rift, ARABNEWS 
(June 13, 2017), http://www.arabnews.com/node/1114206/science-technology. 
 63 See ULRICHSEN, supra note 25, at 173–74 (noting the “rollback of the Arab 
uprisings in North Africa,” including Egypt’s return to “a military-led status quo 
ante,” presented Qatar with immediate foreign policy challenges). 
 64 See Robert Malley, What Happens in the Gulf Doesn’t Stay in the Gulf, 
ATLANTIC (June 7, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/somalia-gulf-crisis-
vegas-rules/562292/; Matthias Sailer & Stephan Roll, Three Scenarios for the Qatar 
Crisis: Regime Change, Resolution or Cold War in the Gulf, SWP COMMENT 3 (July 2017), 
https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/the-qatar-crisis-three-scenarios/. 
 65 See generally Silvia Colombo, The GCC and the Arab Spring: A Tale of Double 
Standards, 47 ITALIAN J. INT’L AFF. 110 (2012) (on the difficulties managing cohesive 
policy within the GCC since the Arab uprisings in 2011). 
 66 No End in Sight to Qatar Row: Bahrain, KHALEEG TIMES (May 27, 2018), 
https://www.khaleejtimes.com/region/qatar-crisis/no-end-in-sight-to-qatar-row-
bahrain (quoting Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa). 
 67 Richard Falk, The Gulf Crisis Reassessed from An International Law Perspective, 
GLOBAL RES. (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-gulf-crisis-
reassessed-from-an-international-law-perspective/5632113. 
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world.”68 Falk suggested that invoking terrorist concerns as a basis for 
expelling Qataris serves as a pretext for indirectly confronting Iran by 
directly disciplining Qatari nationals for their dynastic monarchy’s 
deficient foreign policy alignment with the House of Al Saud.69 Other 
commentators regard the dispute as an attack against Qatar’s 
sovereignty with the Saudi intent of turning Qatar into a vassal state.70 
Still others warn of Qatar’s dangerous practice of playing much larger 
opposing forces against each other and moderating difficulties that 
arise through recourse to its only unquestioned comparative 
advantage—checkbook diplomacy.71 The crisis also stirs speculation 
about the regime change intentions of the Saudi and Emirati royal 
families against the Al Thanis in Doha.72 Bad blood dates from leaked 
recordings in 2014 involving the former emir of Qatar and his foreign 
minister, who contemplated the dissolution and division of Saudi 
Arabia based on internal signs of instability in the House of Saud.73 
Reports further indicate U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson 
intervened in June 2017 “to stop a secret Saudi-led, UAE backed plan 
                                                 
 68 Id. 
 69 See id. 
 70 See Richard Sokolsy & Aaron Miller, Qatar Crisis: Can Rex Tillerson Fix This 
Mess? CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT INT’L PEACE (July 10, 2017), 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/07/10/qatar-crisis-can-rex-tillerson-fix-this-
mess-pub-71483 (casting doubt on diplomacy as a solution for Saudi intentions of 
turning Qatar into a semi-vassal state); and Hassan, supra note 29 (discussing the goal 
of turning Qatar into a vassal state). 
 71 See Qatar: A Dangerous Alliance, Qatar: A Dangerous Alliance-Full 
Documentary, YOUTUBE (Sept. 22, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kHXXan2CRZQ (interviewing Hussain 
Haqqari, Alex Vatanka and Jonathan Schanzer). 
 72 Sailer & Roll, supra note 64, at 2 (concluding that a coming Cold War in 
the Gulf is the most likely scenario but “not completely excluding” regime change 
intentions against the Qatari leadership). 
 73 Former Qatari Emir Conspired with Qadaffi Against Saudi Arabia, AL ARABIYA 
ENGLISH (June 8, 2017), 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/features/2017/06/08/Former-Qatari-Emir-
conspired-with-Gaddafi-against-Saudi-Arabia.html (discussing leaked audio 
recordings leaked in 2014 but dating possible to 2003 allegedly of Qatar emir Hamad 
bin Khalifa and foreign minister Hamad bin Jassim with former Libyan Leader 
Muammar Qaddafi). 
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to invade and . . . conquer Qatar.”74 Such a take-over would 
immediately staunch rapidly depleting Saudi financial reserves, which 
have dwindled by one-third since 2015 due to downward pressure on 
world oil prices.75 
More than affecting Qatar’s sovereign independence, the 
embargo has added another intractable conflict to the Middle East 
landscape. The embargo has dealt a substantial blow to the region’s 
premier international cooperation organization, the GCC,76 which is 
too deeply divided to facilitate policy coordination. It has also 
paralyzed the Arab League, which kept the issue off its recent Cairo 
agenda and refused to issue visas to Qatar’s delegation.77 It has 
                                                 
 74 Alex Emmons, Saudi Arabia Planned to Invade Qatar Last Summer. Rex 
Tillerson’s Efforts to Stop it May have Cost him his Job, INTERCEPT (Aug. 1, 2018), 
https://theintercept.com/2018/08/01/rex-tillerson-qatar-saudi-uae/. 
 75 See Bruce Riedel, Kings and Presidents: Whither the Special Relationship with Saudi 
Arabia? BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 21, 2017), at 5–6, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/fp_20171121_saudi_us_transcript.pdf. Reidel noted the 
Saudi cradle-to-grave social security system is financially unsustainable when oil 
prices dip below 80–85 dollars per barrel, id. at 5, in addition to costs associated with 
its disastrously expensive war in Yemen (estimated at $700 million per month), id. at 
7. 
 76 Geoffrey Martin, Is the GCC Dead After the Qatar Crisis? GULF ST. 
ANALYTICS (Feb. 5, 2018), https://gulfstateanalytics.com/gcc-dead-qatar-crisis/ 
(answering yes but questioning whether the GCC was ever alive); Abdullah Al Shayji, 
Qatar Crisis Casts a Shadow on GCC Unity, GULF NEWS (June 28, 2017), 
https://gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/qatar-crisis-casts-a-shadow-on-gcc-unity-
1.2050430 (noting the “snowballing crisis . . . could undermine the [GCC] bloc”). 
The GCC formed in 1981 as the political and economic alliance of six Gulf States, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. See Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 
Gulf Cooperation Council, 35 PAKISTAN HORIZON 29 (1982). A May 2018 GCC summit 
hosted by the United States has been postponed until September with the hope that 
intermediaries will by then be able to get the disputants back to the GCC. See Warren 
Strobel & Jonathan Landay, White House Postpones Planned Trump Summit with Gulf 
Leaders: Sources, REUTERS (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
gulf-summit/white-house-postpones-planned-trump-summit-with-gulf-leaders-
sources-idUSKCN1HA2H2. For information on the GCC and its Charter, see 
generally SECRETARIAT GEN. GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL, http://www.gcc-
sg.org/en-us/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 2, 2018). 
 77 Egypt ‘Blocks Qatari Officials’ from Attending Arab League Meeting Amid Gulf 
Crisis, THENEWARAB (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/5/9/egypt-blocks-qatari-officials-
from-attending-arab-league-meetings. 
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spawned a breakaway Saudi-Emirati Coordination Council, which has 
already projected a sixty month Ala’azm (Determination) Strategy to 
integrate the two countries in ways that compromise directly the future 
of the GCC.78 It has splintered the Organization of Islamic 
Cooperation (OIC), which formed as a representation of the universal 
Muslim sense of unity (Ummah),79 but now absorbs criticism as a 
financially dependent agency of Saudi hegemony.80 Qatar has criticized 
the OIC for siding with the anti-Qatar bloc,81 drawing key support 
                                                 
 78 See KSA and UAE Announce Joint Vision for Economic, Developmental and 
Military Integration Through 44 Strategic Projects, SAUDI PRESS AGENCY (June 7, 2018), 
https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1774108 
(announcing the Saudi-Emirati Coordination Council’s Ala’azm Strategy). See also 
Simon Henderson, New Arab Gulf Council Reflects Shift in Strategy, Leadership, HILL (June 
10, 2018), http://thehill.com/opinion/international/391431-new-arab-gulf-council-
reflects-shift-in-strategy-leadership (suggesting the death of the GCC in the wake of 
the formation of the Saudi-Emerati Coordination Council). 
 79 See History, ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION, 
https://www.oic-oci.org/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en (noting the 
organization formed in Rabat in 1969 to “galvanize the [u]mmah into a unified 
body”) (last visited Sept. 23, 2018). See also OLIVER ROY, GLOBALIZED ISLAM: THE 
SEARCH FOR A NEW UMMAH 1 (2006) (defining Ummah); Ejaz Akram, Muslim Ummah 
and its Link with Transnational Muslim Politics, 46 ISLAMIC STUD. 381 (2007) (contrasting 
the meaning of Ummah with western nation-state notions of peace and security). 
 80 See Shahram Akbarzadeh & Zahid Shahab Ahmed, Impacts of Saudi 
Hegemony on the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), __INT’L J. POLIT. CULT. SOC’Y 
__ (forthcoming; copy on file with author). With 57 members representing 1.6 billion 
Muslims, the OIC is the world’s second largest international organization after the 
UN. Id. 
 81 See Qatar Condemns Statement by OIC General Secretariat, PENINSULA (June 7, 
2017), https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/07/06/2017/Qatar-condemns-
statement-by-OIC-General-Secretariat. 
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from Turkey, which chairs the OIC82 and, along with the United 
States,83 operates its own military bases in Qatar.84 
The embargo is now a “slow-motion strategic failure,” having 
imprudently discounted Qatar’s small population yet immense 
wealth,85 its commercial and strategic access to the sea, and the 
availability of import substitutes once provided by blockading 
powers.86 The failure of the embargo exposes cross-purpose messages 
and diminished U.S. influence in the region, which formerly 
maintained appearances of common interests and regional cohesion 
on missile defense needs, counterbalances to Iran’s nuclear program, 
                                                 
 82 See Turkey: Isolation of Qatar Is Not Islamic, AL JAZEERA (June 13, 2017), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/turkey-qatar-isolation-islamic-values-
170613131822995.html (noting Turkish President Ergodan’s denunciation of Qatar’s 
isolation). 
 83 Qatar hosts more than 10,000 US and coalition military personnel at the 
Al Udeid Air Base, which serves as the forward headquarters for the U.S. Air Forces 
Central Command and its Combined Air Operations Center (CENTCOM). See Qatar 
to Expand US Airbase as Defence Chief Visits DC, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 29, 2018), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/qatar-expand-airbase-defence-chief-
visits-dc-180129192013144.html. See also Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, 
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/udeid.htm (noting the base is the 
U.S.’ largest in the Middle East) (last visited Sept. 23, 2018). 
 84 See Shehab Al-Makahleh, Is Turkey Preparing to Replace US Military Base in 
Qatar? AL ARABIYA ENGLISH (Mar. 18, 2018), 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2018/03/18/Turkey-
cements-economic-ties-with-military-base-in-Qatar.html (on Turkey’s two military 
bases in Qatar and its 2022 military plan to deploy more troops and establish a naval 
base in Qatar); Suraj Sharma, ANALYSIS: A Quandary for Qatar, and a Global Crisis 
in the Making, MIDDLE EAST EYE (July 4, 2017), 
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/analysis-qatar-crisis-military-diplomacy-
economy-689636344 (discussing the problematizing significance of Turkish soldiers 
in Qatar as a hedge against any attempt to topple the Qatari leadership). 
 85 IMF ranks Qatar as the world’s richest country. See Will Martin, Ranked: 
The 29 Richest Countries in The World, BUS. INSIDER (May 22, 2018) 
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-richest-countries-in-the-world-2018-5 (listing 
Qatar as the richest country based on April 2018 IMF data). 
 86 Gabriel Collins, Anti-Qatar Embargo Grinds Toward Strategic Failure, Issue 
Brief, RICE U. BAKER INST. PUB. POL’Y 1–2 (Jan. 22, 2018), 
https://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/99690/bi-brief-012218-ces-
qatarembargo.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
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and coordinated policy responses to interferences in Lebanon, Syria, 
Yemen, and Iraq. 
While the political context appears frozen, the social, 
economic, and security implications remain fluid. Qatar’s diplomatic 
dexterity and world-wide investments have circumvented the 
economic effects of isolation,87 extended relations with Turkey, 
adroitly managed affairs with Iran, repaired then strengthened ties to 
the U.S., unbalanced Saudi Arabia’s Gulf leadership, and leveraged the 
platform of the ICJ to publicize its victimization.88 Before the 
blockade, Qatar cultivated its role as mediator and outmaneuvered 
Saudi Arabia and Turkey to create a diplomatic outpost for the Taliban, 
establishing Doha as a safe haven hub for high-level discussions and 
peace talks.89 Qatar’s projection of a triangulated foreign policy 
fundamentally balances Saudi Arabian, Iranian, and the United States 
interactions. Qatar has added complexity to its geostrategic station by 
discussing the purchase of a Russian missile defense system;90 a move 
                                                 
 87 See Qatar: 2018 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement 
by the Executive Director for Qatar, IMF STAFF COUNTRY REP. (May 30, 2018), 
http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/05/30/Qatar-2018-
Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-
Executive-45915 (noting Qatar’s economy continues to successfully adjust despite 
the diplomatic rift). 
 88 On Qatar’s portrayal “as a victim of Saudi perfidy” and the increasing 
view in the Arab world that the anti-Qatar quartet represents an autocratic conspiracy 
against political change, see Hassan, supra note 29. 
 89 The establishment of a diplomatic channel of communication with the 
Taliban in Qatar has facilitated the interests of Pakistan and Afghanistan, NATO, 
and has assisted in discussions involving Guantanamo Bay prisoner exchanges and 
the release of U.S. Sgt. Robert “Bowe” Bergdahl from Taliban captivity. See How 
Qatar Came to Host the Taliban, BBC (June 23, 2013), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-23007401. Bergdahl was released in May 
2014 in exchange for five Guantanamo Bay captives released to Qatari 
intermediaries. See also Eric Schmitt & Charlie Savage, Bowe Bergdahl, American Soldier, 
Freed by Taliban in Prisoner Trade, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2014) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/bowe-bergdahl-american-soldier-is-
freed-by-taliban.html. 
 90 See Qatar In Talks with Russia Over S-400 Missile Defense System Purchase, 
MISSILE DEFENSE ADVOC. ALLIANCE (July 10, 2018), 
http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/other-news/qatar-in-talks-with-russia-over-s-
400-missile-defense-system-purchase/ (noting missile purchase discussions between 
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that would run counter to the interoperable air defense aspirations of 
the GCC. Saudi Arabia has threatened a military response.91 
Long-term implications of this blockade and expulsion extend 
beyond the dynamics of regional politics. A central component of the 
Gulf economy is its migrant work force.92 Migrant workers far 
outnumber the indigenous population in the region’s smaller 
countries.93 Migrant communities and governments such as India that 
supply manual and domestic workers to the Gulf States have crucial 
interests at stake.94 The migrant worker economy is regarded among 
the world’s most important global poverty-fighting institutions,95 
notwithstanding well-known abuses involving visa-trading and human 
                                                 
Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani and Russian President, Vladimir 
Putin). 
 91 See Benjamin Barthe, L’Arabie saoudite menace le Qatar d’une “action militaire” 
s’il se dote de missiles S-400, LE MONDE (June 1, 2018), 
https://mobile.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2018/06/01/l-arabie-saoudite-
menace-le-qatar-de-represailles-militaires-s-il-se-dote-de-missiles-s-
400_5308285_3218.html?xtref=. 
 92 See generally Andrzej Kapiszewski, Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers in the 
GCC Countries, in SOUTH ASIAN MIGRATION TO GULF COUNTRIES: HISTORY, 
POLICIES, DEVELOPMENT 46–70 (Prakash C. Jain & Gina Zacharia Oommen eds., 
2016) (noting the economic significance of remittances and the general support for 
such emigration by Gulf States). 
 93 According to the ILO, migrant workers make up the majority of the 
population in Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the UAE, and over 95 percent of the 
domestic and construction work forces of Gulf States. Migrant workers account for 
more than 80 percent of the population in Qatar and the UAE. See generally Labour 
Migration, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/beirut/areasofwork/labour-
migration/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2018). 
 94 See generally Muhammad Azhar, Indian Migrant Workers in GCC Countries, 9 
DIASPORA STUD. 100–11 (2016) (on the post-1973 oil era influx of millions of Indian 
migrants in GCC countries and the impact on the Indian economy). See also Jo 
Jakobsen & Marko Valenta, Moving to the Gulf: An Empirical Analysis of the Patterns and 
Drivers of Migration to the GCC Countries, 1960–2013, 57 LABOR HIST. 627, 630 (2016) 
(noting “[a]lmost half of the total emigrant stock from India, which is by far the 
largest migrant-sending country in South Asia, is received by the GCC” and that the 
GCC hosts over 21 million migrants from the top 25 migrant-sending countries). 
 95 See Omar Al-Ubaydli, The Economics of Migrant Workers in the GCC, ARAB 
GULF ST. INST. WASH. 3 (2015), https://agsiw.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/Omar-Al-Ubaydli_Economic-Migrants_PDF2.pdf 
(citing research from the World Bank and the U.N. Global Commission on 
International Migration). 
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trafficking.96 The International Labor Organization (“ILO”) has 
reported that the Arab States region contains among the world’s 
highest proportions of manual and domestic migrant communities,97 
putting pressure on labor supply states to choose sides in the dispute 
or disengage by reducing nationals’ exposure to increasing regional 
insecurities.98 Since the initiation of the blockade, Qatar has moved to 
quiet concerns about its treatment of migrant workers and improve its 
much criticized kafala (sponsorship) system, which prevented migrant 
workers from fleeing abusive employer practices.99 Criticisms of the 
kafala system are “Gulf wide,” and an array of potential reforms in 
Qatar may add significant pressure to ILO attempts to end exploitative 
labor systems in the region.100 
Of the legal and human rights violations alleged in this 
upcoming dispute at the ICJ, this Article focuses on general issues 
                                                 
 96 See id. at 12–15 (citing visa-trading (where migrants are sponsored for a 
specific position but forced to perform a different job on arrival) and other forms of 
human smuggling and migrant worker abuse). See also Ali Assareh Mahmood 
Monshipouri, Migrant Workers and Their Rights in the United Arab Emirates, in HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: FRAMEWORKS, GOALS, AND STRATEGIES 227–243 
(Mahmood Monshipouri ed., 2011) (discussing regional and country-specific 
practices and labor conditions affecting migrant workers). 
 97 See Labour Migration, supra note 93 (noting in 2015 that there were 32 
million international migrants in the Arab States region). 
 98 See Naser Al-Tamimi, The Gulf Crisis: Why is India Still Neutral? ARAB NEWS 
(July 29, 2017), http://www.arabnews.com/node/1136101/columns (noting that 
the GCC was India’s largest trading partner in 2016, with the UAE and Saudi Arabia 
among India’s top five partners, and that Qatar provided India with almost 19 
percent of its crude energy imports and 62 percent of its natural gas imports); Zahraa 
Alkhalisi & Rishi Iyengar, Philippines Stops Sending Workers to Qatar, CNNMONEY 
(June 6, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/06/news/economy/qatar-
migrant-workers-philippines/index.html (assessing reactions of Qatari migrant 
worker supply states, including the Philippines, India, Nepal, and Egypt). 
 99 See G.B.331/INS/13(Rev.), Governing Body, INT’L LABOR OFF. (Oct. 31, 
2017), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_586479.pdf (on complaints 
concerning non-observance by Qatar of labor standards and general agreements to 
be taken to rectify the situation). 
 100 See Qatar: Implementation Will be Key for Labor Reforms, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/27/qatar-implementation-
will-be-key-labor-reforms (discussing kafala reforms and the impact for the region). 
Bahrain terminated the kafala system in 2009. 
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surrounding the expulsion of aliens,101 with specific concentration on 
the implications for Gulf State relations regardless of a judgment from 
the ICJ. Qatar’s Foreign Minister claimed the suit presented “the first 
step in bringing an end” to serious human rights abuses.102 Even if his 
sense of progress prevails through recourse to international law’s most 
formal dispute settlement mechanism, the journey likely will be long 
and the prospect of a Phyrric victory is high. However, the Emirati 
Foreign Minister dismissed the petition as a deceit, adding that it only 
escalated tensions.103 
Following this introduction, Part II briefly reviews the general 
international law supporting migratory movements as associated with 
the principle of hospitality and then discusses the international law 
relating to expulsions. Part III assesses the benefits and obstacles of 
removing this case from the ICJ’s docket to another, softer law 
environment. For purposes here, soft law means “the ability to get 
what you want through attraction rather than through coercion or 
payments.”104 Its usage redirects the understanding of influence away 
from the formalities and structures of international law, as embodied 
by the ICJ itself, toward a culture of decision-making that emphasizes 
norm socialization, networks and forms of commitment broadly 
                                                 
 101 For purposes here, expulsion is defined in line with the definition 
proffered by Art. 2(a) of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the 
Expulsion of Aliens, with Commentaries, available at 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_12_2014.pdf 
[hereinafter 2014 Report] (“a formal act, or conduct consisting of an action or 
omission, attributable to a State by which an alien is compelled to leave the territory 
of that state . . . .”). 
 102 Qatar Says It Files Case Against UAE at UN’s Highest Court, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 11, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/06/11/world/middleeast/ap-ml-
qatar.html (quoting Qatar’s Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman 
Al Thani). 
 103 See Gargash: We’re Not Surprised by Qatar Lawsuit Given Hajj Lies, NATIONAL 
(June 11, 2018), https://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/gargash-we-re-not-
surprised-by-qatar-lawsuit-given-hajj-lies-1.739057 (quoting Emirati Foreign 
Minister Dr. Anwar Gargash). 
 104 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power and American Foreign Policy, 119 POL. SCI. Q. 
255, 256 (2004). 
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construed.105 The irony of suggesting a route for dispute de-escalation 
through recourse to the failed mechanisms that launched the dispute 
onto the docket of the ICJ is obvious. However, soft power works on 
multiple levels and often emerges from the “cavities” of 
multilateralism to give expression to “power beneath the surface,”106 
particularly when discursive settings can return to a mission-centered 
purpose for reestablishing relationships. 
Qatar has deployed an array of soft power initiatives that 
reform-minded Saudis may quietly envy.107 It has positioned itself as a 
voice of independent news in the Arab world, as a satellite of U.S. 
higher education institutions, as a venue for the 2001 Doha Round of 
WTO talks, the 2012 United Nations Climate Change Conference 
(“COP 18”), the 2006 Asian Games, and the 2022 FIFA World Cup.108 
                                                 
 105 See Francesco Francioni, International ‘Soft Law’: A Contemporary Assessment, 
in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR 
OF SIR ROBERT JENNINGS 167, 167–68 (Vaughn Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds., 
1996) (noting the operation of soft law outside of the system of formal sources that 
are nevertheless capable of producing legal effects); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan 
Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 423 (noting 
that “soft law facilitates compromise, and thus mutually beneficial cooperation, 
between actors with different interests and values, different time horizons and 
discount rates, and different degrees of power”). 
 106 PETER VAN HAM, SOCIAL POWER IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 3 
(“power beneath the surface”), 70 (“cavities” of multilateralism) (2010). 
 107 The new Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman has launched a 
series of anti-corruption and moderate Islam reforms that have suggested the crown 
prince already has undertaken “[t]he most significant reform process . . . anywhere 
in the Middle East today”. Thomas L. Friedman, Saudi Arabia’s Arab Spring, at Last, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/23/opinion/saudi-prince-mbs-arab-
spring.html. For criticisms of Friedman’s opinion of bin Salman’s transformative 
intent, see Filkins, supra note 54. 
 108 See ROBERTS, supra note 30, at 1, 3, 11, and ch. 8. On the movement away 
from an Egyptian-influenced education system to a more western curricula in the 
Gulf region, see Maher Kelifa, Trading Culture: Have Western-Educated Emirati Females 
Gone Western? 1 OIDA INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. 19 (2010). Georgetown 
University, Texas A&M, Northwestern University, Carnegie Mellon University, 
University of Calgary, and Virginia Commonwealth University have established 
campuses in Qatar. See Education in Doha Qatar, ONLINEQATAR, 
https://www.onlineqatar.com/education/universities-qatar.aspx (last visited Sept. 
23, 2018). 
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A unique and intra-elite sense of cohesion, combined with its geo-
strategic station between competing global interests, shape Qatar into 
“its own variety of a developmental state.”109 Such a distinction adds 
complexity in the Arab world, where the world’s only major ruling 
monarchs reside.110 
Qatar’s exercise of subtle power and influence might indicate 
a shift of the center of gravity in the Arab world toward the Persian 
Gulf.111 However, this crisis is as much a consequential loss of social 
cohesion or group feeling (asabîyah) of the Gulf States, as expressed by 
the great fourteenth century Berber philosopher, Ibn Khaldûn in the 
prolegomena to his meditation on the rise and fall of great dynasties.112 
There, he presented a generational stage theory of development that 
explained the rise and fall of the dynastic state.113 Khaldûn drew 
attention to social facts and common circumstances that informed 
state creation and interaction in ways that continued to influence 
contemporary relations.114 With adept soft power experience, Qatar 
should recognize that any reclamation of constructive discourse is 
more likely to follow from informal means of dispute settlement from 
within the GCC and its emerging generational leadership change,115 if 
                                                 
 109 MEHRAN KAMRAVA, QATAR A: SMALL STATE, BIG POLITICS 167 (2013). 
 110 Lisa Anderson, Absolutism and the Resiliency of Monarchy in the Middle East, 
106 POL. SCI. Q. 1 (1991). 
 111 See KAMRAVA, supra note 109, at 165. 
 112 See IBN KHALDÛN, THE MUQADDIMAH: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
HISTORY lxi, 15–68 (Franz Rosenthal trans., Princeton University Press 1967) (1377). 
On the translation of asabîyah, see id. at lxi. Khaldûn associated the loss of asabîya with 
dynastic decline: “as a rule no dynasty lasts beyond the life (span) of three 
generations.” Id. at 343. Transliterated spellings of the term vary, although it also 
commonly appears in English as asabiyyah. 
 113 See id. at 353–55 (discussing stages of success, consolidation of royal 
authority, leisure and tranquility, contentment and peacefulness, and waste and 
squandering). 
 114 See Sema Yilmaz Genç, An Evaluation of Ibni Khaldun’s Thoughts of the 
Economical World, in 2 GLOBALIZATION DIMENSIONS & IMPACTS: GLOBAL STUDIES, 
47 (Hilal Yildiz, Farhang Morady & Ismail Șiriner eds., 2015) (on Khaldûn’s 
historiographic and sociological significance). 
 115 See Becca Wasser & Jeff Martini, The Next Generation of Gulf Leaders, 
FOREIGN AFF. (Feb. 14, 2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-
gulf/2016-02-14/next-generation-gulf-leaders (noting the emergence of Gulf crown 
princes and key ministers who are in their 30s, 40, and 50s). 
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it is able to reconstitute a bond of asabîyah. Although possible, such a 
solution appears remote, except in view of alternatives. Part IV draws 
conclusions about how a change of forum may mute the consequences 
of an Arab predicament that portages the internecine strife of a region 
to a forum likely to render judgment in favor of Qatar. 
II. HOSPITALITY AND EXPULSION 
The western legal tradition regards migration as a “permanent 
feature.”116 The customary law of nations construed hospitality to 
include habituated and recognized rules governing the legal status of 
aliens, strangers, and their right of movement and communication.117 
Migration is an equally well-understood feature of Arabia, where the 
Haj pilgrimage to Mecca historically supported the frankincense 
caravan routes and traditions of nomadic grazing migrations.118 Pre-
Islamic Bedouins regarded hospitality as “central to a noble character” 
and the three great monotheistic religions regard as virtuous the 
hospitable treatment of moving populations.119 
Although supported in political and international literature, the 
treatment of strangers has become a “social problem on a global 
                                                 
 116 Vincent Chetail, Sovereignty and Migration in the Doctrine of the Law of Nations: 
An Intellectual History of Hospitality from Vitoria to Vattel, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 901, 902 
(2016) (noting the law of nations’ symbiotic relationship with migration “from its 
inception.”). 
 117 See generally id. (canvassing opinions of classical western thinkers, 
including Cicero, Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff, and Vattel). But see Nan 
Seuffert, Queering International Law’s Stories of Origin: Hospitality and Homophobia, in 
QUEERING INTERNATIONAL LAW: POSSIBILITIES, ALLIANCES, COMPLICITIES, 
RISKS 213–35 (Dianne Otto ed., 2017) (investigating the allegorical significance of 
hospitality as employed by Vitoria and the sixteenth-century Spanish imperial rule of 
Mesoamerica). See generally GEORG CAVALLAR, THE RIGHTS OF STRANGERS: 
THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL HOSPITALITY, THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY, AND 
POLITICAL JUSTICE SINCE VITORIA (2002); J. Irizarry y Puente, Exclusion and 
Expulsion of Aliens in Latin America, 36 AM. J. INT’L L. 252 (1942) (detailing the 
historical tolerance of domiciled aliens throughout Latin America). 
 118 See generally Migrant Workers in the Arab Middle East, 4 THIRD WORLD Q. 
530 (1982). 
 119 Mona Siddiqui, Welcoming in God’s Name: Hospitality in Islam and Christianity, 
RELIGION & ETHICS (Jan. 5, 2017), 
http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2017/01/05/4600525.htm. 
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scale,”120 particularly in terms of challenges to refugee law.121 Hannah 
Arendt traced the modern origins of the problem to the massive spatial 
disorientation caused by the Great War.122 The disassociation of 
persons from the protective sphere of the state compromised persons’ 
political status,123 creating a legal lacauna or rightless anomaly by which, 
through expulsion, a country could diminish its “burden of 
indésirables.”124 As Arendt concluded, “[t]he world found nothing 
sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human.”125 
Postcolonial theorists, such as Edward Said, assigned to human 
migration a supreme importance “attendant upon war, colonialism and 
decolonization, economic and political revolution, and such 
devastating occurrences as famine, ethnic cleansing, and great power 
machinations.”126 Recent challenges to refugee law among states of the 
Mediterranean region and Southeast Europe, has spawned a 
reexamination of restrictions on mass migration for reasons of national 
                                                 
 120 Nicholas Onuf, Relative Strangers: Reflections on Hospitality, Social Distance and 
Diplomacy, in HOSPITALITY AND WORLD POLITICS 173 (Gideon Baker ed., 2013) 
(noting wide-ranging philosophical and political treatments of hospitality from Kant 
to Derrida). 
 121 See, e.g., Filippo Grandi, Protecting Refugees in Europe and Beyond: Can the EU 
Rise to the Challenge? U.N. HUM. RTS. COMMISSION (Dec. 5, 2016), 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/admin/hcspeeches/58456ec34/protecting-refugees-
europe-beyond-eu-rise-challenge.html (referring to the mass migration influx of 
refugees arriving across Europe beginning in 2015 from the Mediterranean Sea or 
overland through Southeast Europe); Donald Kerwin, The Faltering US Refugee 
Protection System: Legal and Policy Responses to Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Others in Need 
of Protection, 21 REFUGEE SURVEY Q. 1, (2012); Todd Scribner, You Are Not Welcome 
here Anymore: Restoring Support for Refugee Resettlement in the Age of Trump, 5 J. MIG. & 
HUM. STUD. 263 (2017) (assessing the Trump Administration’s migration policy). 
 122 See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 268–75 
(1951) (discussing statelessness as the newest mass phenomenon caused by the 
internal disintegration of World War I). 
 123 See id. at 295 (“Only the loss of a polity itself expels [a person] from 
humanity.”). 
 124 Id. at 281. 
 125 Id. at 295. 
 126 EDWARD W. SAID, REFLECTIONS ON EXILE AND OTHER ESSAYS xiv 
(2000). 
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security in Europe.127 Migration policy and unsecured borders are now 
signature issues in U.S. political and legal discourse, as well.128 
A. Expulsion and the Fear of Terrorism 
The circumstances surrounding the Qatari expulsions add 
another dimension to debates on international migration. Actions 
taken by the UAE against Qatari residents assert no connection to 
historical stateless classifications of Heimatlosen or apatrides—persons 
who (in the post-World War I millieu of Europe) “would not or could 
not assume the nationality of a successor state.”129 They do not 
comport with traditionally understood explanatory economic 
migration theories.130 The UAE’s actions also fall outside the bounds 
of belligerent occupation, as the UAE is not an occupying power 
within the meaning of Geneva Convention IV relative to the 
Protection of Civilians Persons in Time of War.131 Additionally, they 
make no claim connected to refugee status, non-refoulement, illegal entry, 
or itemized illegal activity. The sweeping generality of the UAE 
                                                 
 127 Migrant Crisis: European Commission Proposes Asylum Reforms, BBC (Apr. 6, 
2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35974982 (noting European 
Commission response to the mass influx of refugees across Europe beginning in 
2015). 
 128 See generally Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (holding constitutional 
a presidential proclamation upholding entry restrictions on specific foreign state 
aliens into the United States on legitimate national security grounds). See also Sarah 
Pierce & Andrew Selee, Immigration Under Trump: A Review of Policy Shifts in the Year 
Since the Election, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Dec. 2017), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-under-trump-review-
policy-shifts (discussing political objectives to cut legal immigration and reshape the 
entry of foreign-born workers to the U.S.) (last visited Sept. 23, 2018). 
 129 MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE UNWANTED: EUROPEAN REFUGEES IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 70 (1985). 
 130 See BOGUMIL TERMINSKI, DEVELOPMENT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT 
AND RESETTLEMENT: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND CURRENT CHALLENGES 5 
(2013) (explaining migration decisions in terms of wage differences (the Hicks 
Model), rural-urban dichotomy (the Harris-Todaro Model), stages of development 
(the Zelinsky Model), or positive/negative, push-pull factors (Everett Lee’s Push-
Pull theory). 
 131 See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS, MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 143–78 (1995) (on Geneva Convention IV 
and the issue of deportation of enemy civilians during belligerent occupation). 
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measures add confusion, if not pretext, to emerging views regarding 
possible remediation efforts to combat state-sponsored terrorism, and 
call into mind the infamous 1944 United States Supreme Court 
decision upholding the internment of United States citizens of mostly 
Japanese descent during World War II.132 
Since the events of 9/11, international law has concentrated on 
balancing the protection of human rights and the prevention of 
terrorism.133 Liberal state responses to the challenges of terrorism 
presented a multipronged intermix of political, law enforcement, and 
military actions,134 which prompted criticisms of the inability of the 
liberal state to protect democratic notions of freedom and core secular 
values.135 Important examples in U.S. constitutional history have 
upheld national security restrictions on individual liberties, including 
the rights of citizens.136 On balance, “restrictions on individual liberties 
. . . have been upheld in the context of national security imperatives 
                                                 
 132 See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (justifying a 
presidential executive order to intern Japanese Americans based on national security 
notwithstanding application of the Equal Protection Clause’s strict judicial scrutiny 
standard for race-based classifications). In Trump v. Hawaii, the majority seemingly 
overruled Korematsu, (C.J. Roberts noting the decision “was gravely wrong” and 
“has no place in law under the [c]onstitution” even though the majority noted that 
“Korematsu ha[d] nothing to do with this case.”). See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423. 
 133 See Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, Fact Sheet No. 32, OFF. 
U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS., at 19 (2008), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Factsheet32EN.pdf. 
 134 See PAUL WILKINSON, TERRORISM VERSUS DEMOCRACY: THE LIBERAL 
STATE RESPONSE chs. 4–6 (2d ed. 2006). See generally Cynthia Banham, The Torture of 
Citizens After 9/11: Liberal Democracies, Civil Society and the Domestic Context, 20 INT’L J. 
HUM. RTS. 914 (2016). 
 135 See Orlando Patterson, Freedom and 9/11, 21 DEMOCRACY: A JOURNAL 
OF IDEAS (2011), https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/22/freedom-and-911/. 
 136 See, e.g., Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65–24, 40 State 217 (repealed 
1948); Sedition Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65–150, 40 Stat. 553 (repealed 1921); Alien 
Registration Act of 1940 [Smith Act], Pub. L. 76–670, 54 Stat 670 (repealed 1950); 
and various forms of emergency legislation, including, National Emergencies Act of 
2000, 50 U.S.C. § 1621; International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 
[IEEPA], Pub. L. 95–223, 91 Stat. 1626 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1706 (2000)); USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272. 
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. . . that would likely not have been permitted absent such 
justifications.”137 
Responses from the Arab world noted the fitful liberal 
reactions, described generically by the former deputy director of the 
International Crisis Group’s Middle East branch as the flailing of a 
“blinded Cyclops.”138 The inability of western states to frame a 
synthetic and coherent response to terrorism stimulated the subaltern 
reorientation within the Arabian Peninsula world toward its own 
assessment of threats to security—sectarian conflicts between Shiite 
and Sunnis and challenges to monarchic rule stemming from the Arab 
Spring.139 
In a continuing display of confused and cross-purpose foreign 
policy, the Trump administration initially presented a mixed message 
on the Qatari crisis.140 Secretary of State Tillerson expressed sympathy 
for Qatar in the face of the Saudi-led boycott in 2017, whereas 
President Trump declared Qatar a “funder of terror at a very high 
level.”141 President Trump then reversed his position and described 
                                                 
 137 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and 
the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 675, 698 (2004) 
(reviewing U.S. case law and balancing tests employed by courts to acquiesce, defer, 
or steer clear of ripeness or political questions involving executive judgments on 
restrictions of liberty during ongoing national security imperatives). 
 138 Joost Hilterman, Deep Traumas, Fresh Ambitions, in LEGACIES OF THE 
IRAN-IRAQ WAR (Middle East Research and Information Project, Spring 2018), 
https://www.merip.org/mer/mer257/deep-traumas-fresh-ambitions (specifically 
noting U.S. policy since the 2003 invasion of Iraq). See MADAWI AL-RASHEED, A 
HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA xiii (2d ed. 2010) (on the impact of 9/11 and sectarian 
concerns in Saudi Arabia). 
 139 See Borzou Daragahi, 9/11 from Arab Shores, FOR. POL’Y (Sept. 2011), 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/09/09/911-from-arab-shores/. 
 140 See Robert Malley & Jon Finer, Fixing Trump’s Blunders on Qatar, WASH. 
POST (June 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-
opinions/wp/2017/06/09/fixing-trumps-blunders-on-
qatar/?utm_term=.560f684c8186 (calling U.S. mixed messages “head-spinning”). 
 141 Peter Baker, Trump Now Sees Qatar as an Ally Against Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/world/middleeast/trump-
qatar-terrorism.html (quoting President Trump). Conflicting reports have emerged 
about whether the Saudis and Emiratis would have launched the blockade without 
prior approval from the White House. See Filkins, supra note 54 (quoting a former 
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Qatar as a partner in the fight against extremism.142 At the same time, 
Qatar announced plans to double its investments in the U.S. to $250 
billion.143 
Either display sublimated direct consideration of the 
underlying expulsion issue. Executed with due process and mindful of 
individual circumstances, the expulsion of aliens is a long and 
established, but not absolute, sovereign right of states.144 The 
International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) Draft Articles on the 
                                                 
U.S. intelligence officer who claimed the White House “gave the green light” and a 
senior administration official, who denied the claim). 
 142 See id. (noting the “remarkable turnaround” in US policy toward Qatar). 
 143 See David A. Patten, Qatar’s Emir Promises To Step Up Ties, Invest $250 Billion 
in US, NEWSMAX (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/emir-
tamim-qatar-donald-trump-middle-east/2018/04/13/id/854468/ (noting President 
Trump more recently called the Qataris “great friends” as its emir promised to 
double trade and investment with the US, including a possible $10 billion partnership 
with Exxon to develop U.S. shale oil deposits, the purchase of a $300 million guided 
missiles system, $18 billion in additional investments in the U.S. by 2020, a $1.7 Qatar 
Airways letter of intent to purchase fighter jets from Boeing, and possible investment 
projects in Florida, Texas, South Carolina, and Washington, D.C.). 
 144 See Expulsion of Aliens in International Human Rights Law (OHCHR 
Discussion Paper, Sept. 2006), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/migration/taskforce/docs/Discussion-
paper-expulsions.pdf (recognizing the qualified right of states to regulate the 
presence of foreigners on their territory); C-143—Migrant Workers (Supplementary 
Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143), adopted June 24, 1975, INT’L LABOUR ORG., 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100
_ILO_CODE:C143#A13 (recognizing expulsion in accordance with individual 
safeguards). See also Jorge Bustamante (Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Migrants), Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, ¶ 64, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/12 
(Feb. 25, 2008) (affirming due process treatment on individual bases for irregular 
migrants and those persons involved in interceptions at sea). Doctrinal references to 
the right of expulsion abound. See, e.g., Irizarry y Puente, supra note 117, at 257 (noting 
in Latin America the right to remain “is a privilege” subject to law); PATRICK 
DAILLER & ALAIN PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 664 (Paris: L.G.D.J. 
1999) (noting the right is generally recognized); Lawrence Preuss, International Law 
and Deprivation of Nationality, 23 GEO. L.J. 250, 272 (1934) (affirming the right to expel 
aliens is not in doubt); HENCKAERTS, supra note 131, at 45 (indirectly acknowledging 
the right except when violative of “non-discrimination principle”); Lamin Jalamang 
Sisi, Expulsion of Aliens in International Law: Some African Case Studies 84-85 
(doctoral dissertation, Johns Hopkins, 1975) (confirming the right to expel). 
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Expulsion of Aliens (2014), recognized a general right of states to expel 
aliens from their territory, but only “in accordance with . . . other 
applicable rules of international law, in particular those relating to 
human rights.”145 The Draft Article’s specific reference to human 
rights assumed a respect for human rights that necessarily arises from 
expulsion cases. This justification, if not derived from treaty law, finds 
support in general rules prohibiting arbitrariness, abuse of rights, and 
denial of justice.146 Case law and state practice support consideration 
of procedural due regard, as discussed below. 
For example, in the Maal Case, an early twentieth century 
arbitration between the Netherlands and Venezuela, “large 
discretionary powers” inhered in the right of a state to expel “in a 
proper and lawful manner” persons “dangerous to the welfare of the 
country.”147 In the 1980s, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal noted 
that international law guaranteed “certain procedural and substantive 
minimum standards” even though a state had “wide discretion” to 
expel foreigners.148 Security Council Resolution 1456 (2003) reflected 
the mix of legal factors involved in expulsion cases, including 
international criminal and humanitarian law, refugee law, and human 
rights law, and these considerations stand behind the Council’s 
conclusion that “[s]tates must ensure that any measure taken to combat 
terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law.”149 
If done en masse, problems arise.150 
                                                 
 145 Art. 3, Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, with commentaries. 
International Law Commission A/69/10 (Nov. 11, 2014), 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_12_2014.pdf. 
 146 See id. cmt. (2). 
 147 Maal Case, Mixed Claims Commission, Netherlands-Venezuela, June 1, 
1903, X UNRIAA 730, 731. 
 148 Yeager v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran United States Claims 
Tribunal, Award of Nov. 2, 1987, 17 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL REP. 92, 106. 
 149 S.C. Res 1456, ¶ 6 (Jan. 23, 2003), https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/undoc/GEN/N03/216/05/PDF/N0321605.pdf?OpenElement. 
 150 See JULIA WOJNOWSKA-RADZIŃSKA, THE RIGHT OF AN ALIEN TO BE 
PROTECTED AGAINST ARIBITRARY EXPULSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (2015) 
(citing the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Non-Citizens’ report on 
collective expulsion of aliens). 
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i. Collective Expulsion and Countervailing UAE and Qatari 
Arguments 
The UAE argued that its case was not about racial 
discrimination based on “national origin” but about lawful measures 
against the State of Qatar, not its nationals.151 The UAE objected to 
the application of the Convention, arguing that “the preconditions for 
the seisin of the Court” were never fulfilled.”152 Qatar summarized the 
UAE’s actions as “measures that purposefully target[ed] and infringe[d] 
the rights of Qataris protected under the Convention on the basis of their 
national origin.”153 
 Article 5 of CERD requires states parties to guarantee 
the equal enjoyment of basic human rights to all, regardless of race or 
national origin.154 Article 2 of the Convention obligates states to 
eliminate racial discrimination.155 According to the Convention’s 
travaux preparatoires, the articles, taken together, “[e]nsure that non-
citizens are not subject to collective expulsion, in particular situations 
where there are insufficient guarantees that the personal circumstance 
of each of the persons concerned have been taken into account.”156 
Initially, expulsion related to the forced removal of persons 
across a state boundary. The late Cherif Bassiouni, a leading authority 
on international criminal law, noted that the prohibition of deportation 
now includes forced population transfers applied to the “compulsory 
movement of people from one area to another within the same 
State.”157 The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) statute includes 
                                                 
 151 Qatar v. UAE, Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record CR 2018/15, 
Friday, June 29, 2018, at 4:30 pm, at 3 (Mr. Pellet) https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/172/172-20180729-ORA-02-01-BI.pdf. 
 152 Id. at 4. 
 153 Qatar v. UAE, Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record CR 2018/12, 
Wednesday, June 27 2018, at 10 am, at 34 (Ms. Amirfar) (emphasis in original). 
 154 See CERD, art. 5, supra note 3. 
 155 See id., art. 2. 
 156 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General 
Recommendation XXX on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, UN doc. 
CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004), ¶ 26. 
 157 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 312 (2d rev. ed, 1999). 
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among its definition of crimes against humanity “deportation or 
forcible transfer of population.”158 The ILC Draft Articles define 
expulsion to mean “a formal act or conduct attributable to a State by 
which an alien is compelled to leave the territory of that State.”159 
Exceptions include extradition, surrender to an international criminal 
court or tribunal, or the non-admission of an alien to a state.160 
Distinctions arise with regard to persons unlawfully present in a 
territory161 and to refugees.162 However, the Draft Articles “move 
beyond the national laws of many states and the European Union” by 
covering aliens regardless of whether they entered the state legally.163 
                                                 
 158 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art 7(1)(d), July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, (entered into force July 1, 2002). The Statute defines deportation 
or forcible transfer of population to mean “forced displacement of the persons 
concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are 
lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law.” See id. art. 
7(2)(d). Unlawful deportations or transfers are also classified as war crimes. See id. 
art. 8(2)(a)(vii). The ICC also establishes “persecution” as a separate crime against 
humanity—if done against an identifiable national group on grounds impermissible 
under international law. See id. art. 7(1)(h). Deportation has been recognized as a 
crime against humanity in each of the major international criminal instruments prior 
to the ICC, including the Nuremberg Charter, the Tokyo Charter, the Allied Control 
Council Law No. 10, and the statutes of the international criminal tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The long-standing definition of “deportation” as a 
crime against humanity included the crime of forced population transfer within a 
state’s borders. 
 159 Art. 2, 2014 Report, supra note 101, at 4. 
 160 Id. 
 161 For various conventional treatments of lawful or irregular aliens, see 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 13, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 14668 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees art. 32, July 28, 1951,189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) 
[hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons, adopted on Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (entered into force June 6, 1960) 
(various declarations and reservations); Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness art. 31, Aug. 31, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1975). 
 162 See Refugee Convention, supra note 161. 
 163 Sean D. Murphy, The Expulsion of Aliens and Other Topics: The Sixty-Fourth 
Session of the International Law Commission, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 164, 165–66 (2013). 
Important human rights conventions do differentiate between lawful aliens and 
unlawful aliens on matters of expulsion. See Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, Art. 32, July 28, 1951, 189 UNTS 150; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Art. 13, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; 
European Convention on Establishment, Art. 3, Dec. 13, 1955, ETS No. 19, 
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In line with established international law, the Draft Articles preserve 
the extraterritorial prohibition of refoulement, which protects refugees 
from returning to frontiers of territories where they have a well-
founded fear of persecution based on a limited set of considerations.164 
No contracting state shall return (“refouler”) a refugee to the frontier 
territories where life or freedom would be threatened.165 
ii. Individual Assessment of Circumstance 
The expulsion of aliens as a group egregiously disregards the 
individual assessment of circumstance, as specifically required in 
several international human rights treaties and the Draft Articles.166 
                                                 
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/ 019.htm; 
American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 22(6), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 UNTS 123, 
9 ILM 673 (1970), as amended by protocols of Nov. 14, 1988, 28 ILM 156, and June 
8, 1990, 29 ILM 1447; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Art. 12(4), 
June 27, 1981, 21 ILM 58 (1982); Arab Charter on Human Rights, Art. 26, May 22, 
2004, reprinted in 12 INT’L HUM. RTS. REP. 893 (2005). 
 164 Art. 6(b), 2014 Report, supra note 101, at 10. See also Refugee Convention, 
supra note 161, art. 1(A)(2) (“owing to [a] well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion”). 
 165 Refugee Convention, supra note 161, art. 33(1). See also European 
Convention of Human Rights (Protocol 4) art. 3, E.T.S. No. 46 (1963); non-refoulement 
is implicit in art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“no one shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”). The 
Human Rights Committee, likewise, has interpreted art. 7 of the ICCPR as 
prohibiting expulsion where there is a risk of torture. See General Comment No. 
20/44, ¶ 9, Apr. 3, 1992. The Committee on the Rights of the Child adopted a 
General Comment on unaccompanied and separated children outside their country 
of origin, noting such children should not be returned “where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm.” See General 
Comment No. 6, ¶ 27, Sept. 1, 2005. See also Convention Against Torture art. 3, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987), (applying to every such person regardless 
of threats to public security). 
 166 See art. 9, 2014 Report, supra note 101, at 14 (Prohibition of collective 
expulsion) and cmt. (1) (citing the International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (art. 22(1)), the 
American Convention on Human Rights (art. 22(9)), the European Convention on 
Human Rights (art. 4, Protocol No. 4), the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (art. 12(5)), and the Arab Charter on Human Rights (art. 26(2)). See also art. 4, 
2014 Report, supra note 101, at 6 (holding that “[a]n alien may be expelled only in 
pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law.”). 
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Case law before the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) adds 
to the well-established definition of collective expulsion; such action 
precludes any measure taken by a competent authority to compel aliens 
as a group to leave a country, except where taken after and on the basis 
of a reasonable and objective examination of the particular cases of 
each individual alien of the group.167 In the ECHR, the term “aliens” 
refers to persons lawfully residing, domiciled or merely passing 
through a country.168 The focal point of review in these circumstances 
relate generally to a determination that the applicant runs a real risk of 
suffering ill-treatment if returned.169 
The UAE’s actions circumvent the persecution trigger 
mechanism for the application of the refoulement prohibition. Qataris 
express no fear of returning to their own government. However, 
assessments relating to persons subject to expulsion (ratione personae) 
and to the measures of expulsion (ratione materiae) depend on a 
reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each 
individual alien.170 With no specific allegation of criminality or 
wrongdoing, the weight of evidence indicates that international law 
prohibits the UAE’s collective expulsions,171 or that the UAE is 
                                                 
 167 See, e.g., Andric v. Sweden, application no. 45917/99, ECtHR (relating to 
Art. 4 of Protocol No. 4—Prohibition of Collective Expulsion of Aliens). 
 168 See Case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, application no. 27765/09, 
ECtHR (2012) (involving the interception of Somali and Eritrean nationals and 
disembarkation to Libya by Italian naval authorities). 
 169 See Hilal v. United Kingdom, application no. 45276/99, sec. 60 ECRH 
2011-II; See also Irizarry y Puente, supra note 117, at 264–67 (reviewing national 
security expulsion factors from Latin American history). 
 170 See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Fifty-Ninth Session (7 May–5 June 
and 9 July–10 August 2007), ¶ 199 n. 400, U.N. Doc. A/62/10 (2007) (prohibition 
of collective expulsion); ILC Drafting Committee, Progress Report on the topic ‘Expulsion 
of Aliens,’ INT’L L. COMMISSION (July 24, 2009), 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/9_12.shtml. 
 171 See art. 5(2), 2014 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 101, at 8 (“A State may 
only expel an alien on a ground that is provided for by law”); art. 19(1) of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Collective expulsions are 
prohibited); art. 22(9) American Convention on Human Rights; art. 26(2), Arab 
Charter on Human Rights; art. 12(5), African Convention on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights [prohibiting mass expulsions aimed at national, racial, ethnic or religious 
groups]; and art. 25, Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
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attempting to fabricate a national emergency shield or derogation from 
immigration practices. While the Draft Articles provide for expulsion 
“on grounds of national security or public order,”172 and preclude 
collective expulsions except for “enemy aliens in the context of an 
armed conflict,”173 “any form of disguised expulsion of an alien is 
prohibited.”174 Disguised expulsions contemplate constructive 
expulsions, which apply to methods of expulsion that shade the 
adoption of a decision to expel,175 or, to actions intended to infringe 
the human rights of the alien in question.176 Furthermore, the Draft 
Articles preclude expulsions that are “arbitrary” or “punitive in 
nature.”177 
National security derogation clauses tend to hinge on one or a 
combination of four factors, including: (1) a sudden and unforeseen 
emergency of unknown duration; (2) the potential gravity of the 
emergent situation as dangerous or life threatening; (3) the 
pronouncement by an official acting under the color of state authority; 
and (4) the necessity and immediacy of a response.178 Sean Murphy 
noted that “several major human rights instruments set forth 
obligations relating to expulsion, but also allow for derogations from 
those obligations in time of emergency.”179 The Refugee Convention, 
for instance, subjects the prohibition against refoulement to exceptions 
based on national security or public order.180 However, even in these 
circumstances, which do not apply here, and “[e]xcept where 
compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the refugee 
shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear [themselves] and be 
                                                 
 172 2014 Report, supra note 101, art.7, at 12. 
 173 Id. art. 9(4). 
 174 Id. art. 10(1). 
 175 Id. art. 10, cmt 1. 
 176 Id. art. 10, cmt 2. 
 177 Id. art 19(1)(a). 
 178 U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the 
National Emergency, National Emergency, hearings, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., April 11–
12, 1973 (Washington: GPO, 1973), p. 277; See also Matti Pellonpää, Expulsion in 
International Law: A Study in International Aliens Law and Human Rights with 
Special Reference to Finland 86–93 (doctoral dissertation, Faculty of Law, University 
of Helsinki, 1984) (on derogations that threaten the life of the nation). 
 179 Murphy, supra note 163, at 166. 
 180 Refugee Convention, supra note 161, at art. 32(1). 
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represented before competent authority.”181 More generally, 
comparative international law reveals a variety of procedural measures 
and guarantees attaching to the expulsion of aliens.182 Grounds for 
revoking procedural guarantees based on national security or public 
order still require precise application in view of individual 
circumstances.183 
B. A Minor and Major Problem 
The history of expulsions found notable expressions in the 
twentieth century with the turmoil and aftermath of two world wars.184 
Although framed in terms of western and central European diasporas, 
other examples equally affected the Muslim world. In 1947, millions of 
Muslims were expelled from India to Pakistan, while millions of 
Hindus and Sikhs trekked in the opposite direction—all a consequence 
of partitionment following British colonial rule.185 Other exoduses 
included the flight of 750,000 Palestinian Arabs in 1948,186 the Algerian 
exodus to Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, tribal diffusions due to 
decades of war in Sudan, Muslim migrations due to strife in Bosnia in 
1992, and other population dispersions due to the Gulf War, the 
                                                 
 181 Id. art. 32(2). 
 182 See Wojnowska-Radzińska, supra note 150, ch. 4 (on the variety of 
procedural guarantees against arbitrary expulsion, including issuance by a competent 
authority, notice, audi alteram partem (the right to be heard), the right of appeal, 
access to counsel). 
 183 See id. at 136–40. 
 184 See generally ARENDT, supra note 122; R. M. DOUGLAS, ORDERLY AND 
HUMANE: THE EXPULSION OF THE GERMANS AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
(2013). See also HENCKAERTS, supra note 131, at 1–2 (noting numerous historical 
examples including the expulsion of Jews from England (1290) and Spain (1492), 
Muslims from Spain (1610), Huguenots from France (1685), Protestants from 
Salzburg (1731), French-Acadians from Nova Scotia (1755), the Cherokee Nation 
from Georgia to Oklahoma (1835–1838), Armenians from the Ottoman Empire 
(1915–1916), and Jews from Nazi Germany). 
 185 William Dalrymple, The Great Divide: The Violent Legacy of Indian Partition., 
NEW YORKER (June 29, 1015), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/29/the-great-divide-books-
dalrymple. 
 186 Dawn Chatty, The Duty to be Generous (Karam): Alternatives to Rights-Based 
Asylum in the Middle East, 5 J. BRIT. ACAD. 177, 183 (2017). 
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Kurdish diaspora, and the Arab Spring.187 In 1990, Saudi Arabia 
expelled one million Yemenis in response to the Sana’a government’s 
support of Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.188 More recently, the 
Saudi kingdom launched another expulsion program after years of 
consuming migrant labor.189 Within a four-month period in 2013–
2014, Saudi Arabia expelled more than 160,000 Ethiopians.190 Saudi 
expulsions of Ethiopian and Yemini migrants eclipse significantly the 
magnitude of the numbers involved in the Qatari case now before the 
                                                 
 187 Khadija Elmadmad, An Arab Convention on Forced Migration: Desirability and 
Possibilities, 3 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 461, 462, 464, 480 (1991). Many demographic 
separations and large-scale population transfers result as partitionments and remedies 
for ethnic war; Ewa Tabeau & Jakub Bijak, War-Related Deaths in the 1992-1995 
Conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Critique of Previous Estimates and Recent Results, 21 
Eur. J. Population 187, 189–90 2005) (noting the “extraordinary migration and ethnic 
cleansing of Bosnian muslims by Serbs); Patrick Kingsley, “Arab Spring Prompts 
Biggest Migrant Wave Since Second World War,” Guardian (Jan. 3, 2015), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2015/jan/03/arab-spring-
migrant-wave-instability-war (noting mas migrations across much of the Arab world 
due to spiraling instability since the Arab Spring). For an assessment in relation to 
the propensity for violence, see generally Chaim D. Kaufmann, When All Else Fails: 
Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century, 23 INT’L SECURITY 120 
(1998). 
 188 Ian Black, Saudi Arabia Expels Thousands of Yemeni Workers, GUARDIAN 
(Apr. 2, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/02/saudi-arabia-
expels-yemeni-workers. 
 189 See Felix Horne, Why Saudi Arabia Must Halt the Deportation of Half a Million 
Ethiopians, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 24, 2017, 8:40 AM), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/24/why-saudi-arabia-must-halt-deportation-
half-million-ethiopians; Bethan McKernan, Saudi Arabia ‘Deports 40,000 Pakistani 
Workers Over Terror Fears’, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 13, 2017, 4:59 PM), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-deports-
40000-pakistan-workers-terror-fears-attacks-counter-terrorism-a7578151.html. The 
expulsion of Yemeni workers from Saudi Arabia has been associated with the 
recruitment efforts of the Houthi against anti-Saudi forces in the Yemen civil war. 
See Bethan McKernan, Yemen Civil War: Saudi Expulsion of Yemeni Workers Swells Houthi 
Ranks, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 11, 2018, 11:41 PM), 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-civil-war-saudi-
arabia-houthi-yemeni-workers-expel-deport-fighters-recruitment-al-qaeda-
a8248506.html. 
 190 See Marina de Regt & Medareshaw Tafesse, Deported Before Experiencing the 
Good Sides Of Migration: Ethiopians Returning From Saudi Arabia, 9 AFR. & BLACK 
DIASPORA: INT’L J. 228, 229 (2015) (attributing the forced return of undocumented 
migrants to the indirect destabilizing effects of the Arab Spring). 
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Court. Additionally, Human Rights Watch reported that Pakistan 
“pushed out nearly 365,000 of [its] 1.5 million registered Afghan 
refugees [between 2014–2016], as well as just over 200,000 of the 
country’s estimated [one] million undocumented Afghans.”191 The UN 
International Organization for Migration (“IOM”) reported that Iran 
expelled 384,506 undocumented Afghans since January 2018.192 In 
2017–2018, attacks by Myanmar’s armed forces against Rohingya 
Muslims pushed approximately 500,000 persons into to Bangladesh, 
killing thousands of civilians in the process.193 Mohammed Abdiker, 
IOM director of operations and emergencies, categorically concluded 
that, since the beginning of 2018, Saudi Arabia has returned 17,000 
Yemenis to their war-torn homeland that Saudi Arabian bombings 
forced them to flee.194 On July 5, 2018, the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security partially extended its 2015 Temporary Protected 
Status (“TPS”) for Yemenis based on “ongoing armed conflict” that 
“pose[d] a serious threat” to the “personal safety” of returning 
nationals.”195 Nevertheless, the International Rescue Committee 
                                                 
 191 Pakistan Coercion, UN Complicity: The Mass Forced Return of Afghan Refugees, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Feb. 13, 2017), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/02/13/pakistan-coercion-un-complicity/mass-
forced-return-afghan-refugees. 
 192 See Return of Undocumented Afghans, Weekly Situation Report 17-23 June 2018, 
U.N. INT’L ORG. MIGRATION (2018), 
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Migrants to War Zone, REUTERS (May 9, 2018, 6:45 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-saudi-migrants/u-n-urges-
saudi-arabia-not-to-deport-yemeni-migrants-to-war-zone-idUSKBN1IA1F7. 
 195 Designation of the Republic of Yemen for Temporary Protected Status, FED. REG. 
(Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/09/03/2015-
21881/designation-of-the-republic-of-yemen-for-temporary-protected-status 
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estimated that the U.S. action “could ultimately result in the forcible 
return of an estimated 400 Yemeni citizens”196 to an active war zone 
that the U.S.-supported197 Saudi-led coalition is invading. 
The small number of Qatari expulsions, framed in terms of a 
much larger and ongoing problem, support the timely significance of 
the application now before the Court.198 This case focuses attention on 
one aspect of a worldwide problem, as topical today as during the 
marauding aftermath of WWI, yet still largely beyond the ambit of 
international judicial review. 
III. AN ACT OF METAPHORICAL SIGNIFICANCE? 
Aside from the factual circumstances of the Qatari expulsions, 
the metaphorical significance of portaging this regional drama to the 
docket of the ICJ may serve the interests and performative behaviors 
of multi-layered audiences, both internal to the disputants, and 
external, as presented on the stage of public opinion. Construed as an 
act of ceremonial profanation, Qatar’s suit conforms to the framework 
analysis of sociologist Erving Goffman,199 who noted the utility of 
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 198 In discussing the lingering effect of judicial precedent in international 
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interaction rituals used to express both vendetta and victimology,200 
particularly when parties view negotiations as pointless.201 Expressed 
in terms of international law, the weight of the law suggests Qatar’s 
suit likely will prevail. Construed by the anti-Terror Quartet as a public 
act of shaming or spite, the emotional dynamics of Qatar’s suit may 
not go unavenged.202 
A. Courtroom Clash as a Reputational Value 
The field of international relations has turned attention to 
binary explanations for causes of disputes, certainly since publication 
of Samuel Huntington’s immensely influential ‘clash of civilizations’ 
thesis.203 The significance of the “clash” metaphor at the level of the 
ICJ reinforces the confrontation of countervailing legal principles 
dispassionately deconstructed and applied by a disinterested review 
body as a definitive resolution to a dispute. Peter Katzenstein and 
others have dissected Huntington’s thesis, noting that it undervalues 
the discrete, pluralistic and weakly institutionalized underpinnings of 
the civilization idea, and that it is factually and empirically incorrect: 
“most of the world’s violent clashes occur within rather than between 
                                                 
interaction dynamics and principles of dramaturgy); ERVING GOFFMAN, 
INTERACTION RITUAL: ESSAYS IN FACE-TO-FACE BEHAVIOR (1967) (ritualizing 
face-work and social interaction encounters). 
 200 INTERACTION RITUAL, supra note 199, at 86. Counsel for the UAE 
alluded to this point in discussions regarding provisional measures. See Qatar v. UAE 
Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record 2018/14, June 29, 2018, at 4:30 pm, at 6 
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 202 See Part of Prof. David Des Roches Remarks during GIF Panel on the One Year 
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 203 See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASS OF CIVILIZATIONS 
AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996) (portraying civilizations as coherent, 
monolithic, and disposed to clash). 
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different civilizations.”204 To construe this dispute more as a family 
feud than an inter-state rivalry layers complexity onto simplistic binary 
classifications. Moreover, international law and relations scholars have 
rephrased binary clashes, as for instance between legitimacy and 
legality,205 legitimacy and authority, or globalization/modernization 
and traditionalism.206 These counter-positions only further simplify the 
multi-tiered relational aspects involved in this case. 
As the most politically liberal of the Gulf States, Qatar’s 
confrontations within the region attract comparisons to this latter 
binary juxtaposition as a force of modernization against tradition. 
Qatar’s lack of an indigenous Ulama class of Islamic legal scholars, 
powerfully established in Saudi Arabia, contributes to Qatar’s secular 
characterization as more comparable to Turkey than Saudi Arabia.207 
However, presentations of this crisis in terms of the structural forces 
of globalization overlook the intramural tensions within Wahhabism 
and Saudi Arabia’s projection of its status as the Wahhabist 
counterforce to Shi’ism. Qatar’s discomfort with Saudi Arabia’s 
foreign policy, which projects a de facto alliance with U.S. and Israeli 
interests as against Iran, and possible concerns about Saudi Arabia’s 
stability, better account for the rudimentary intramural cause of this 
crisis rather than any conclusion of a peninsular turn toward 
liberalism.208 
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The presumption of the clash metaphor is that formalized 
court structures are able to dispose of these clashes by rendering a legal 
judgment while not necessarily disposing of the underlying tensions. 
Soft law forums may downplay the necessity of rendering judgment 
while symbolically removing stigmatic spite actions to backchannel 
quarters, blunting, but not necessarily disposing of, tensions magnified 
by publicity and theatrics. Since 9/11, emotional dynamics associated 
with interstate conflict, particularly as related to terrorism, have 
received increasing scholarly attention.209 However, the formal 
mechanisms unlocking the jurisdiction of the ICJ present no 
mechanism for dealing with the dynamics of spite, humiliation, or 
shaming that stand behind the means of resolving this interstate 
conflict. 
Qatar’s appeal to the ICJ as a means to enforce compliance 
with CERD and remedy a broken relationship with Gulf State 
counterparts may rely on the international pressure generated by the 
reputation costs associated with noncompliance with an ICJ decision. 
This courtroom confrontation presents a symbolic form of dramaturgy 
that allows Qatar a self-aware and voluble stage to emote before a 
world audience that turns a tin ear to the plight of forced expulsions 
elsewhere in the region.210 Costs associated with defiant 
noncompliance diminish a country’s reputational commitment to the 
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rule of law and standing in the international community.211 Little 
evidence suggests that characterizing the UAE as outside the rule of 
law will serve as an inducement for or prophylactic against preserving 
the efficacy of an ICJ judgment. 
B. An Opportunity for the GCC? 
Soft power forums present discursive environmental 
opportunities removed from traditional multilateral rule-making 
formats, often encumbered by asymmetrical relationships between 
negotiating interests.212 They rearrange status-conferring expressions 
of decision-making by providing more flexible, informal, or hybrid 
methods of discourse and agenda setting.213 Associational groups such 
as Troikas, Wise Men, IGAD, and the Arctic 5 represent examples of 
intentionally innovative, flexible sub-multilateral soft law structures 
designed to facilitate less formal persuasion channels of 
communication.214 The six original members of the GCC created the 
organization to resemble the European Union, with the ideal of 
establishing a single common market and monetary system.215 
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Attempts to turn the GCC into a common security organization pre-
date the organization’s formal birth in 1981.216 Although perceived as 
a stable and positive force on the Arabian Peninsula for almost four 
decades,217 key policy-makers have most recently described the 
organization as “pretty much finished.”218 According to Kristian 
Ulrichsen, Qatar’s strained relationship with its Gulf neighbors 
represents the barometer of post-Arab Spring politics.219 “Just as the 
uprising that ousted President Mubarak from power galvanized 
demonstrators across the region, so the reinstatement of military rule 
[in Egypt] sent a clear message about the embedded power of counter-
revolutionary forces and vested interests.”220 
Nevertheless, scholars have advocated for a “more insightful 
appreciation” of how the sub-state institutional processes of the GCC 
have contributed to the complexity of decision making in the Gulf,221 
at a minimum by serving as a forum to sustain diplomatic channels of 
communication. The utility of the GCC remains, despite the broad, yet 
dysfunctional outlines once oriented toward an economic union or 
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collective security organization. Historian Hanna Batatu explored the 
deep significance of kinship, more so than professional status or 
epistemic discourse, as the crucible for holding together Arab power 
structures.222 Sociologist Ali Al-Wardi distinguished Arabian 
Peninsular relations in terms of tension with geographic implications 
between sedentary (hadara) and more dominant nomadic (badawa) 
social structures.223 Political Scientist Nazih Ayubi hybridized Al-
Wardi’s distinction to include peninsular political tribal associations 
that co-existed with the state.224 Such expressions of group solidarity 
operate well below the high political level that many strategists 
envision for the GCC. 
Establishing the GCC as an effective security structure to 
harmonize the operability of regional security and defense systems, or 
to put it again on a wishful path of interdependent economic 
coordination overplays an eagerness for such integration among 
autocrats and yet unduly diminishes a capacity to informally set 
agendas among kith and kin. Despite familial and dynastic conflict, 
fundamental and mutual concerns remain. Although they contain five 
percent of the world’s population, Arab countries endured one-fourth 
of the world’s conflicts between 2010–2013 and eighteen percent of 
the world’s conflicts between 1948–2014.225 Almost forty-five percent 
of all terrorist attacks occurred in Arab countries in 2014,226 
contributing to an alarming Arab Gulf arms race that spent $181 billion 
in 2014 alone.227 The perceived need to preserve a stage for discussion 
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suggests the viability of a soft law forum in the Arabian Peninsula, 
within or without the structure of the GCC. Some form of soft law 
association will outdistance GCC detractors. It is noteworthy that 
throughout the duration of this embargo, “the largest and longest gas 
pipeline in the Middle East,” pumping two billion standard cubic feet 
per day of refined methane gas from Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City 
to the UAE,228 has remained open and unaffected by the blockade. A 
purposeful intent to recapture a dwindling sense of asabîyah may 
account less for this uninterrupted flow than the forty-nine percent 
interest in the pipeline company held by French and U.S. 
conglomerates.229 At a minimum, however, important common 
commercial interests suggest a continuing basis for quiet diplomacy 
and the means by which distracted major powers can facilitate de-
escalation of tensions now before the ICJ. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Ibn Khaldûn’s generational theory of dynastic decline charted 
the fractious, ineffective, and personalized quarrels that detract from 
organized growth models and contribute to political instability and 
regional upheaval. Despite “rapid economic growth” since 1990, labor 
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productivity in the Gulf State region continues to decline.230 The 
challenge for a new generation of Gulf leaders will be to break the 
inertial bond of rentier development that impedes labor productivity 
and entrepreneurialism,231 and restore the diminished sense of asabîyah 
that now results in dynastic factionalism. 
Qatar has unique advantages. It has a $320 billion sovereign 
wealth fund.232 It owns more assets in London than the Queen of 
England, about ten percent of the Empire State Building, Paris’s Saint-
Germain Football Club, and numerous other global holdings. 233 It is 
“the world’s biggest producer of liquefied natural gas” (“LNG”),234 
controls thirty percent of this world market,235 and dominates the Asia-
Pacific trade, “the world’s largest LNG-importing region.”236 Qatar 
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shares the world’s largest gas field with Iran,237 which necessarily 
implies the need to manage a relationship worth potentially trillions of 
dollars.238 Additionally, Qatar insures against a breakdown in that 
relationship by subsidizing239 and hosting the largest U.S. airbase in the 
Middle East,240 which provides Qatar with much needed security 
insurance against Iran and increasingly, Saudi Arabia, given its supreme 
disadvantage: less than fifteen percent of Qatar’s population of 2.7 
million are nationals.241 
With so few citizens and so much wealth, Qatar easily insulates 
its domestic population from the popular movements that have 
disrupted the Arab street. A change in Saudi Arabia’s succession plan 
witnessed on June 21, 2017 the Saudi king’s appointment of his son, 
Mohammed bin Salman as crown prince, replacing the king’s nephew, 
Mohammed bin Nayef as heir apparent to the throne. Machinations 
involving that power consolidation,242 Saudi Arabia’s badly progressing 
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war in Yemen, a distracted if not inconsistent U.S. foreign policy in the 
region,243 which may have contributed to Secretary of State Tillerson’s 
abrupt departure,244 forestall coordinated action and occlude 
consideration of the intramural peninsular rivalries that have long 
turned the region into a game of thrones.245 Such distractions 
contribute to forms of ceremonial profanation that, on the one hand 
threaten to turn Qatar into an island through construction of a moat, 
and on the other hand seek an aspirational judicial resolution at the 
ICJ. Such are the choices produced on a public stage. 
As dysfunctional as the situation may appear, the most likely 
means of restoring at least a modicum asabîyah would be to remove the 
dispute from the center stage of peninsular politics, which poses a 
zero-sum solution for Qatar and Saudi Arabia/UAE. Despite the 
sounding death-knell of the GCC, movements off the political and 
juridical center stage appear to be taking shape. Qatar should have 
good reason to choose a softer route, unless it senses the generational 
demise of the House of Al Saud is approaching. 
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